UC-NRLF 


WHO     SHALL     WRITE     OUR     klLIHlHY     HISTORY? 

Reprinted  from 
THE  IKFAKTRY  JOURNAL. 


GIFT   OF 


WHO  SHALL  WRITE  OUR 
MILITARY  HISTORY? 


Proceedings  of  a  Conference  on  the  Military  History  of  the 

United  States  at  the  Twenty-Eighth  Annual  Meeting 

of  the  American  Historical  Association,  Boston, 

Massachusetts,    December    28,    1912 

:A. 

M..  APR..2..-.10.11.. 


Reprinted   from  the 

INFANTRY  JOURNAL 

for  January- February,  1913 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

THE  UNITED  STATES  INFANTRY  ASSOCIATION 
1913 


Who  Shall  Write  Our  Military  History? 

Proceedings  of  a  Conference  on  the  Military  History  of  the  United  States 

at  the  Twenty-Eighth  Annual  Meeting  of  the  American  Historical 

Association,  Boston,  Massachusetts,  December  28,  1912. 

NOTE. — Through  the  interest  of  a  number  of  the  members  of  the  American 
Historical  Association,  following  Professor  R.  M.  Johnston's  introduction  of  the 
subject  in  the  September-October  INFANTRY  JOURNAL,  a  conference,  at  the  recent 
annual  meeting  of  the  Association  in  Boston  and  Cambridge,  was  devoted  to  the 
consideration  of  our  military  history,  with  particular  reference  to  the  means  whereby 
at  least  a  start  may  be  made  towards  writing  it  in  accordance  with  modern  historical 
method.  Upon  the  invitation  of  the  American  Historical  Association  the  general 
staff  of  the  Army  was  represented  by  Major  James  W.  Me  Andrew,  U.  S.  Army, 
under  orders  of  the  War  Department,  and  by  Captain  George  H.  Shelton,  2Qlh 
Infantry,  and  Captain  Arthur  L.  Conger,  i8th  Infantry.  Professor  Albert  Bush- 
nell  Plart,  of  Harvard,  presided.  Because  of  the  importance  of  the  subject  and  the 
discussion  thereof,  as  well  as  the  interest  manifested  by  the  attending  members,  the 
proceedings  are  reproduced  here  in  practically  complete  form. 


T 


HE  MEETING  was  called  to  order  at  ten  o'clock  a.  m.     The  chairman, 
Professor  Hart,  said: 


This  conference,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  has  been  called  at  the  instance  of 
several  people,  military  and  civilian,  who  feel  that  the  science  of  military  history 
has  entered  upon  a  new  aspect,  that  the  point  of  view  towards  military  events 
and  their  relation  to  civil  history  and  to  the  destinies  of  the  nation  has  some 
what  altered  and  that  it  is  to  the  advantage  of  the  American  people  that  there 
should  be  a  more  intelligent  understanding  of  military  history,  with  a  view  to 
the  protection  of  the  nation  in  the  future.  Armies  used  to  be  destructive,  and 
when  they  had  gone  through  a  campaign  they  left  a  wilderness  behind  them. 
The  armies  of  to-day  are  delensive;  their  part  in  the  present  day  in  maintaining 
civilization  is  to  prevent  such  fearful  catastrophes  as  those  which  overtook 
all  the  elder  civilizations  down  to  one  thousand  years  ago.  We  are  here, 
further,  to  join  in  a  conference  between  civilians  and  military  men.  I  take 
it  that  the  main  purpose  of  this  meeting  is,  by  an  exchange  of  views,  to  come 
upon  some  plan  by  which  the  furtherance  of  military  history  in  the  proper 
sense  shall  be  facilitated.  The  civilian  present  who  has  most  acquaintance 
with  these  data,  these  details,  is  my  colleague,  Professor  R.  M.  Johnston,  and 
I  will  ask  him  what  he  thinks  may  be  done  by  such  a  conference  and  by  the 
enlargement  of  such  a  science. 

PROFESSOR  JOHNSTON  said: 

Whatever  my  preferences  may  be,  I  feel  I  cannot  evade  at  the  outset  a 
question  that  will  undoubtedly  present  itself  to  many  of  those  here  present. 
The  issue  had  better  be  met  frankly,  or  else  our  position  will  remain  uncertain 
and  assailable.  The  study  of  military  history  is  at  the  present  moment  under 
a  cloud.  There  is  more  than  a  disposition  to  frown  it  down,  to  taboo  it  as 

264340 


being  in  some  way  antagonistic  to  the  call  of  pacifism  which  holds  the  public 
ear.  The  study  of  war  in  the  minds  of  many  would  make  us  accessories  to 
putting  back  the  clock  of  civilization. 

Now  what  is  the  answer  to  that?  Perhaps  the  best  answer  we  could  make 
on  the  present  occasion  would  be  to  point  to  the  President  of  the  Association, 
Colonel  Roosevelt.  Who  could  prove  more  conclusively  by  his  public  acts 
that  a  man  whose  courage  and  fighting  instincts  are  almost  excessively  developed 
may  yet  be  the  strongest  and  most  rational  advocate  of  peace?  I  allude,  of 
course,  to  the  treaty  of  Portsmouth.  But  there  is  perhaps  a  better  reason. 
Are  we  not,  as  scholars,  entitled  to  say  to  the  pacifists:  If  you  wish  to  put 
down  war,  surely  you  should  wish  to  ascertain  what  are  the  facts  of  war, 
otherwise  how  can  you  present  a  case?  And  our  object  as  students  of  history 
is  simply  and  dispassionately  to  set  out  facts;  we  will  leave  it  to  others  to 
argue  from  them.  But  for  myself  I  prefer  to  rest  our  case  on  even  stronger 
ground.  I  prefer  to  say  that  at  a  moment  when  so  much  false  sentimentalism, 
uninformed  flabbiness  and  gush  are  the  fashion  and  we  hear  so  little  about  those 
ancient  virtues  of  which  military  courage  is  the  strong  and  secure  rock,  little 
enough  harm  will  be  done  if  a  few  of  us  at  least  cultivate  a  subject  which  is 
largely  concerned  with  them. 

The  subject  of  military  history  presented  few  difficulties  in  the  days,  not  so 
long  passed,  when  history  itself  was  considered  merely  a  branch  of  polite 
literature,  not  to  say  rhetoric.  The  historian's  solicitude  was  concentrated 
on  the  flags  and  the  drums,  on  the  roar  of  the  guns,  and  the  awful  carnage; 
and  he  made  extremely  vivid  and  completely  false  pictures  out  of  it  all. 
Within  a  very  few  years  past  we  have  changed  all  that,  just  as  in  pure  literature 
Captain  Bluntschli  and  his  invaluable  chocolate  have  rapidly  superseded 
Captain  d'Artagnan  and  his  overworked  rapier. 

In  ordinary  political  history  we  have  prosaically  got  down  to  the  documents 
and  to  a  close  and  unrhetorical  examination  of  facts  as  facts.  So  in  military 
history  we  have  abandoned  the  drum  and  trumpet  and  begun  to  analyze  the 
psychology  of  generals,  on  the  documents  critically  examined,  and  their  tactical 
and  strategical  methods  as  seen  from  a  technical  point  of  view.  And  it  may 
be  said,  not  unfairly,  that  to  judge  from  the  innumerable  bad  books  and  few 
really  first  rate  ones  produced  the  subject  is  one  of  extreme  difficulty. 

Of  late  years  military  history  has  received  growing  attention  in  Europe, 
and  in  a  large  sense  the  lead  in  this  movement  may  be  ascribed  to  Germany. 
It  was  largely  by  a  technical  study  of  her  campaign  against  Austria  in  1 866  that 
she  succeeded  in  improving  her  army  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  secure  the  result 
she  obtained  in  the  war  against  France  in  1870.  She  continued  on  the  same 
path  after  that  war,  and  other  countries  followed,  making  the  historical 
study  of  war  the  basis  for  the  efficient  organization  of  their  national  armies. 
In  other  words  a  present  necessity,  an  actual  military  problem,  has  inspired 
much  of  the  best  work  that  has  been  done. 

It  would  exceed  the  limits  of  the  time  at  my  disposal  to  review  the  condition 
of  military  historical  studies  in  Europe;  I  will  confine  myself  to  pointing  out 
a  few  of  the  facts,  and  to  contrasting  them  with  those  in  this  country.  Most 
of  the  great  European  nations  have,  as  one  of  the  essential  parts  of  their 
general  staff,  an  historical  section.  In  France  and  Germany  these  bodies 
stimulate  much  valuable  work  and  make  possible  the  publication  of  much 
documentary  matter.  They  are  stronger,  however,  on  their  technical  than 


on  their  scholarly  side,  and  their  work  often  suffers  from  being  written  too 
near  the  event.  In  those  same  two  countries  are  published  several  first  rate 
journals  and  magazines  devoting  themselves  wholly  or  in  part  to  military 
matters  and  history.  In  a  recent  quarterly  number  of  the  Historisches 
Jahrbuch  of  the  Gorres  Geselschaft,  which  pays  little  attention  to  military 
history,  I  counted  in  the  current  bibliography  over  twenty  titles  for  the 
Franco-Prussian  war  alone.  With  us,  while  we  have  several  excellent  service 
journals,  the  editor  of  one  of  which  we  are  fortunate  enough  to  have  with  us 
to-day,  it  is  hardly  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  military  history  plays  no  part 
in  them. 

Then  there  is  the  academic  side.  In  England,  where  military  history  is 
not  nearly  as  much  developed  as  in  France  and  England,  Oxford  has  a  chair 
of  military  history  filled  by  Professor  Wilkinson.  In  addition  the  university 
has  in  Professor  Oman  one  of  the  foremost  military  historians  of  the  day, 
while  Professor  Firth  has  produced  at  least  one  quite  remarkable  book  in 
the  same  field.  In  Germany  there  is  a  famous  seminar  in  military  history, 
that  of  Professor  Delbriick  at  Berlin.  In  this  country  a  half-course  which  I 
give  intermittently  at  Harvard  is,  so  far  as  I  know,  the  only  thing  of  the  sort 
to  be  found  in  our  universities,  though  our  military  institutions  pay,  as  is 
natural,  some  attention  to  the  matter,  as  the  welcome  presence  at  this  meeting 
of  Major  McAndrew  and  Captain  Conger  demonstrates. 

And  yet  we  have  all  the  necessary  elements  for  this  study  ready  to  our  hands. 
In  the  Civil  War  and  the  mass  of  printed  documentary  material  which  the 
government  has  published  we  have  the  most  admirable  field  imaginable  for 
seminar  work,  for  the  production  of  a  whole  library  of  first  rate  military 
histories.  The  society  of  which  we  are  the  appreciative  guests  to-day  has 
shown  the  way  in  publishing  excellent  material  for  military  history,  and 
occasionally  strategical  and  tactical  studies  of  real  value.  We  have  produced 
much  military  history  of  a  minor  character,  especially  memoirs.  A  past  mem 
ber  of  this  society  established  a  notable  reputation  as  a  military  historian, 
and  we  have  among  us  to-day  those  who  are  following  in  the  footsteps  of  the 
late  John  Codman  Ropes.  Among  young  men  at  college  are  many,  I  believe, 
who  would  gladly  take  up  this  work  if  only  a  lead  were  given  them. 

What,  then,  are  we  to  do  to  further  our  purpose?  That  is  precisely  what  we 
are  here  to  discuss,  and  I  do  not  wish  to  anticipate  what  others  may  have  to 
suggest.  But  this  much  it  is  at  all  events  safe  to  say.  If  we  can  get  experts 
in  scholarly  methods  and  experts  in  military  science  to  extend  the  friendly 
hand  of  cooperation;  if  we  can  obtain  more  recognition  for  historical  work 
at  army  headquarters;  if  we  can  establish  seminar  work  in  our  universities; 
if  we  can  find  or  found  a  journal  in  which  military  history  would  obtain  recog 
nition;  if  we  could  found  a  national  society  for  military  history — by  all  or 
by  any  such  steps  we  should  certainly  further  the  cause  of  this  deserving  study. 

THE;  CHAIRMAN:  Military  history  includes  two  terms,  the  subject  and 
method,  and  military  science  and  discussion  of  military  events  and  principles, 
and  nothing  could  be  more  fitting  than  that  this  conference  should  participate 
of  both  elements.  We  are  very  fortunate  indeed  in  the  presence  and  the 
interest  here  of  several  members  of  the  United  States  Army,  of  whom  I  shall 
call  as  the  first  Captain  Arthur  L.  Conger,  of  the  Army  Service  Schools  at 
Fort  Leaven  worth. 


CAPTAIN  CONGER  said: 

No  one  appreciates  better  than  the  military  man  the  fact  that  military 
history  to-day  plays  the  role  of  Cinderella.  Occasionally  at  these  meetings 
she  may  be  dressed  magically  by  some  fairy  godmother,  such  as  our  friend 
Professor  Johnston  on  this  occasion,  and  taken  to  the  ball  for  a  few  brief 
dances  with  the  prince,  but  this  does  not  prevent  her  having  to  return  to  her 
place  in  the  ashes  on  the  kitchen  hearth  as  soon  as  the  ball  is  over.  While 
her  sisters  occupy  a  place  of  honor  in  the  world,  no  one  has  either  a  kind  word 
or  any  attention  to  give  her.  Yet  we  who  know  our  Cinderella  know  that  she 
is  really  more  beautiful  than  all  her  sisters  and  look  forward  with  hope  to  the 
time  when  the  prince  shall  seize,  as  she  departs,  the  golden  slipper,  in  the  form 
of  a  conception  of  what  military  history  really  is,  whereby  he  may  seek  her 
out,  identify  her,  and  give  her  her  rightful  place  in  the  palace. 

Why  is  it  that  military  history  is  to-day  a  discredited  subject  among 
scholars,  and  why  are  such  military  histories  as  we  have  so  unsatisfactory  and 
misleading? 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  Germany,  which  has  given  us  our  historical 
method  and  our  modern  conception  of  war,  should  have  failed  to  combine 
the  two  and  set  a  standard  for  the  writing  of  military  history.  Yet,  though  the 
historical  section  of  the  German  general  staff  publishes  an  increasing  number 
of  volumes  yearly,  the  contents  of  these  volumes  shows  not  only  that  the 
writers  are  not  acquainted  with  the  principles  of  historical  method,  but  that 
the  direction  is  imbued  with  Napoleon's  conception  of  official  history — a 
point  of  view  promulgated  by  the  government  for  its  own  purposes.  Thus 
we  may  see  how  wide  a  gap  in  the  matter  of  history  exists  between  the  official 
military  world  and  the  world  of  scholarship  as  represented  by  the  German 
universities.  Nor  are  the  universities  given  access  to  the  war  archives,  as 
that  could  only  result  in  overthrowing  the  official  view. 

The  historical  section  of  the  German  general  staff  is  indissolubly  connected 
with  the  name  of  von  Moltke,  who  as  chief  of  staff  organized  it  and  gave  close 
supervision  to  its  work.  While  von  Moltke  had  no  training  in  historical 
method,  in  the  modern  sense,  yet  his  large  experience  enabled  him  to  appre 
ciate  the  value  of  first-hand  evidence  and  he  brought  to  the  investigation 
of  the  wars,  the  historic  materials  for  the  study  of  which  were  under  his 
control,  a  certain  ripeness  of  judgment  and  practical  knowledge  which  saved 
him  many  errors. 

The  war  of  1866  with  Austria  was  the  first  important  war  in  which  Prussia 
had  been  engaged  for  more  than  a  half-century.  It  was  thus  manifestly 
of  prime  importance  for  von  Moltke,  and  indeed  the  whole  army,  to  study  the 
history  of  that  war  in  detail  in  order  to  ascertain  the  good  as  well  as  the  bad 
features  of  Prussian  training  and  tactics,  to  clear  up  beyond  question  those 
points  which  needed  improvement  to  insure  success  gainst  a  more  formidable 
foe  than  Austria. 

The  facilities  for  a  review  of  events  in  campaign  in  the  German  army  may 
be  appreciated  when  it  is  known  that  every  evening  each  battalion  and  higher 
commander  makes  a  report  of  the  day's  events.  Should  he  desire  to  change 
his  report  subsequently  he  cannot  have  the  original  report  back,  but  may 
forward  as  many  supplementary  reports  as  he  pleases,  to  be  filed  with  the 
original.  Anyone  who  has  worked  with  our  own  Civil  War  reports,  many  of 
them  written  months  after  the  events  described,  cannot  fail  to  appreciate 


the  relatively  easy  task  history  writing  would  be  were  this  wealth  of  data 
available,  by  subordinates  as  well  as  principals  and  all  written  the  same  day. 

Take  in  connection  with  the  above  the  methodical  trained  habits  of  the 
German  staff  officer:  he  sets  his  watch  each  morning  with  the  official  time 
piece  at  headquarters;  at  each  important  occurrence  during  the  day,  be  it 
the  time  of  opening  artillery  fire  or  the  time  the  column  reaches  a  certain 
crossroad,  he  consults  his  watch  and,  not  trusting  memory,  jots  down  the  event 
with  the  precise  time  in  his  note-book.  Some  note-books  of  this  character 
have  been  published  in  facsimile,*  and  one  can  readily  see  that  with  records 
of  this  sort  kept  and  turned  in  to  the  historical  bureau,  historical  writing  may 
become  a  matter  of  far  greater  precision  than  has  hitherto  been  possible. 

The  manner  in  which  von  Moltke  dealt  with  the  materials  of  the  war  of 
1866  may  best  be  appreciated  by  a  study  of  the  Memorial  of  July  25,  i868,"j" 
presented  to  the  king  proposing  certain  changes  in  and  additions  to  the 
regulations.  From  this  we  may  see  that  almost  no  detail  of  tactics  was  too 
small  to  escape  his  notice.  The  causes  of  success  as  well  as  of  failure  were 
examined  and  the  proposed  changes  in  the  regulations  were  all  based  on  a 
careful  study  of  actual  occurrences. 

Thus  the  spirit  of  the  study  of  the  war  of  '66  was  one  of  investigation  in 
which  von  Moltke  and  the  general  staff  are  seeking  to  know,  and  so  far  as 
practicable  to  promulgate  the  truth  about  the  war.  After  1870  various 
causes  combined  to  produce  a  change  of  attitude.  The  quarrel  between 
Bismarck  and  von  Moltke  in  front  of  Paris,  the  undesirability  of  allowing  the 
French  or  even  the  Germans  to  realize  by  how  narrow  a  thread  success  had 
often  hung  in  the  balance  during  the  war,  and  the  growing  friction  between 
the  states  of  the  newly  formed  German  Empire  pointed  to  a  policy  not  only 
of  suppression  but,  where  desirable,  of  conversion  of  facts,  and  the  employ 
ment  of  the  official  historical  bureau  to  promote  certain  political  aims  soon 
became  adopted  as  a  fixed  policy. 

The  work  of  preparing  the  official  account  of  the  war  of  1870-71  was 
completed  in  1873  and  bears  the  imprint  of  the  master-mind  of  von  Moltke, 
whose  cunning  hand  is  visible  again  and  again  in  artfully  concealing  the 
truth  without  becoming  too  deeply  involved.  It  was  soon  recognized,  how 
ever,  that  certain  statements  in  the  official  history  explaining  the  reasons  for 
the  concentration  on  the  Rhine,  J  implying  that  the  movement  of  troops  to 
the  frontier  was  only  begun  after  the  completion  of  the  mobilization  and 
asserting  that  the  concentration  was  carried  out  to  the  last  detail  on  a  pre 
arranged  plan  without  friction  §  were  likely  to  prove  misleading  to  German 
officers  themselves  and  thereby  injure  the  efficiency  of  the  army  in  future 
campaigns.  To  correct  these  wrong  impressions  means  were  taken  to  give 
the  army  the  real  facts  without,  however,  disclosing  them  publicly. 

When  it  came  to  dealing  with  the  causes  of  failure  of  the  French  army  in 
1870  we  find  the  official  history  stating:^]" 

*See,  for  example,  "Lebenserinnerungen  von  Gustav  von  Schubert," 
Leipzig,  1909,  p.  320. 

f'Moltke's  Taktisch-strategische  Aufsatze,"  published  by  the  Great 
General  Staff  on  the  centenary  of  von  Moltke's  birth,  Berlin,  1900,  p.  73. 

Ji 870-7 1,  vol.  i,  pp.  84-88. 

§1870-71,  vol.  I,  p.  86. 

fVol.  I,  p.  22. 


8 

The  internal  state  of  the  army  labored  under  serious  disadvantages.  .  .  . 
The  non-commissioned  officers  had  lost  their  former  high  position.  .  .  . 
The  junior  officers  of  the  army  did  not  devote  their  entire  abilities  to  the 
service.  .  .  .  The  prevailing  favoritism  extended  even  to  persons  of  tarnished 
reputation  very  naturally  disgusted  them  and  opened  out  very  little  prospect 
for  the  future.  .  .  .  The  same  element  of  favoritism  had  also  raised  into 
high  positions  many  men  who  were  unequal  to  their  duties,  exercising  its 
disastrous  influence  here  as  it  ever  will.  Owing  to  the  constant  change  in 
the  form  of  government,  that  loyalty  and  attachment  to  a  lineal  dynasty 
which  in  other  countries  avert  dangers  to  the  public  well  being,  had  ceased 
to  exist  both  in  the  army  and  in  the  nation. 

The  last  sentence  betrays  the  purpose  of  the  whole,  to  build  an  argument 
in  favor  of  a  lineal  dynasty  by  ascribing  the  failure  of  the  French  army  in 
a  large  measure  to  the  fact  that  Napoleon  III  had  not  been  born  to  the  purple. 
The  facts  that  conditions  were  reversed  in  1 806,  and  that  probably  no  armies 
were  ever  more  devoted  to  their  leaders  than  were  his  later  ones  to  Napoleon  I, 
are  overlooked. 

One  section  of  the  German  general  staff  concerns  itself  with  writing  mono 
graphs  on  wars  in  which  Germany  has  not  herself  taken  part.  In  these  we 
find  displayed  the  strongest  partisanship,  as  well  as  every  pretext  made  use 
of  for  justifying  the  German  military  system. 

Thus  we  read  in  the  monograph  on  the  Boer  war: 

The  British  military  administration  cannot  be  absolved  from  the  severe 
reproach  that  it  had  not  properly  appreciated  the  tactical  experiences  of 
former  struggles  in  South  Africa.* 

The  regulations  under  which  the  army  took  the  field  in  1899  followed 
comparatively  closely  the  lines  of  the  German  regulations.  The  unfavorable 
conditions  of  training,  however,  under  which  especially  the  infantry  and 
cavalry  suffered  in  the  mother-country,  where  exercises  in  varied  terrain 
are  almost  an  impossibility,  prevented  the  materialization  of  the  principles 
of  training  approved  in  Germany.! 

A  footnote  quotes  Lord  Wolseley  as  saying  that  "Maneuvers  on  the  con 
tinental  system  were  impracticable  in  England  since  they  would  unfavorably 
affect  recruiting."! 

When  we  stop  to  consider  what  are  the  former  struggles,  lack  of  considera 
tion  of  which  is  so  severe  a  reproach,  we  find  the  episodes  of  Majuba  Hill 
and  the  Jameson  Raid  hardly  enough,  it  seems,  to  build  a  new  system  of 
tactics  upon. 

In  view  of  the  similarity  between  the  German  and  English  tactics,  the 
general  staff  finds  it  necessary  to  explain  why  these  tactics  proved  wanting 
in  South  Africa,  and  ascribes  it  to  faulty  training.  No  mention  is  made  of 
the  fact  that  the  German  tactics  were  found  equally  inapplicable  to  the  con 
ditions  of  warfare  in  Germany's  own  African  colonies. 

In  the  footnote  we  find  the  opportunity  of  justifying  the  German  maneuver 
system  and  conscription  law  eagerly  taken  advantage  of;  also  the  real 
objection  to  the  maneuvers  as  conducted  in  Germany,  namely,  the  hardship 
caused  by  quartering  troops  on  the  inhabitants,  is  skilfully  lost  to  view. 

But  not  content  with  casting  slurs  on  the  British  War  Office  and  system 

*Kriegsgeschichtliche  Einzelschriften,  Heft  32,  p.  16. 
\Ibid.,  p.  17. 
%Ibid.,  p.  1 8. 


of  training,  the  general  staff  history  strikes  further  directly  at  the  morale  of 
the  troops: 

With  the  fruitless  yet  by  no  means  especially  costly  attacks  at  Paardeburg 
there  began  to  spread  a  nervousness  of  suffering  loss,  and  of  making  an  attack 
which  bore  bad  fruit  far  beyond  the  limits  of  South  Africa,  while  one  sub 
stantial  reason  for  the  long  continuance  of  the  war  was,  undoubtedly,  the 
avoidance  of  striking  any  crushing  blow  at  the  Boers. 

The  account  goes  on  to  relate  that  it  would  have  been  easy  (for  the  Boers) 
to  penetrate  through  their  (the  English)  thin  firing  line  and  for  Cronje  to 
escape  but  for  the  errors  of  deWet  and  other  leaders.* 

The  injustice  of  this  becomes  apparent  when  we  consider  the  heroic  losses 
sustained  by  certain  British  organizations  at  Paardeburg  without  flinching, 
and  that  the  failure  of  the  attack  must  be  ascribed  to  faulty  orders  of  the  high 
command  resulting  in  undue  dispersion  and  lack  of  coordination  of  the  attack 
ing  troops  rather  than  to  losses  or  nervousness  resulting  from  losses.  From 
this  time  on  we  find  further  that  the  Boers  were  unable  to  make  any  effective 
resistance  to  the  main  British  advance,  which  was  everywhere  successful. 
In  the  guerilla  warfare  which  followed  we  find  the  Boers  skilfully  avoiding 
contact  with  main  columns  but  descending  in  relatively  overwhelming  forces 
on  lightly  guarded  convoys  and  small  bodies  of  troops  which  often  offered 
heroic  resistance  against  overwhelming  odds.  In  strong  contrast  with  its 
arraignment  of  the  British  morale  at  Paardeburg  the  German  official  account 
credits  the  failure  of  the  Boers — who  throughout  the  war  proved  unable  to 
take  up  and  sustain  a  vigorous  offensive — to  an  "error  of  judgment"  on  the 
part  of  the  Boer  leaders,  thus  seeking  to  deprive  the  English  of  the  credit 
of  deserving  even  the  successes  which  they  actually  reaped. 

The  British  artillery  also  comes  in  for  its  quota  of  disparagement.  The 
account  says,  referring  to  the  lyddite  shells: 

In  spite  of  the  overwhelming  fire  .  .  .  their  effect  on  the  well  intrenched 
Boers  was  small.  When  they  burst  they  usually  made  a  most  diabolical 
noise,  but  the  fragments  were  very  few  in  number,  and  the  shells  made  holes 
in  the  sandy  soil  about  60  cm.  (two  feet)  wide  and  30  cm.  (one-foot)  deep.f 

The  account  goes  on  to  quote  from  a  participant: 

The  lyddite  shells  had,  as  a  rule,  no  effect  whatever  on  men  lying  down. 
I  have  been  present  myself  when  Boers  had  their  clothes  scorched  by  bursting 
lyddite  projectiles  but  only  had  their  skins  scratched.  The  Boers  had  little 
respect  for  the  British  artillery,  especially  for  its  lyddite  fire.  .  .  .  We 
were  frequently  not  deterred  thereby  from  getting  out  from  under  cover  to 
make  coffee  under  lyddite  fire. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  a  shell  making  a  hole  in  sandy  soil  two  feet  wide  and  a 
foot  deep  is  a  shell  of  unusual  power  for  a  field  gun.  A  high-powered  shell 
is,  however,  not  usually  employed  against  troops,  but  to  demolish  particular 
objects,  since  their  effect  is  highly  localized.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  a  quotation 
is  introduced  without  reference  to  person,  time,  or  place,  for  the  very  trans 
parent  purpose  of  instilling  into  the  minds  of  German  officers  the  belief  that 
the  British  artillery  is  not  to  be  dreaded,  and  also  into  the  minds  of  the  British 

*Kriegsgeshichtliche  Einzelschriften,  Heft  33,  p.  71. 
jlbid.,  p.  73. 


10 

that  their  artillery  is  not  to  be  relied  on  for  effectiveness,  for  it  is  well  known 
that  these  monographs  are  promptly  translated  into  English  and  perhaps 
more  widely  read  and  credited  in  England  than  in  Germany. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  how  far  from  being  calm,  judicial,  and  critical  investi 
gations  into  the  truth  of  history  are  the  German  official  accounts.  Nor  is 
this  onesidedness  confined  to  their  dealings  with  foreign  nations  such  as 
France  and  England;  it  becomes  apparent  in  their  treatment  of  the  troops 
of  the  minor  German  states. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  crossing  of  the  lines  of  march  of  the  Prussian 
Guard  Corps  and  the  XII  (Saxon)  Corps,  on  the  i8th  of  August,  1870,  was 
not  accidental,  but  was  designed  in  order  to  bring  the  Guard  Corps  into  what 
was  believed  to  be  the  place  of  honor  for  making  the  decisive  attack.  It 
had,  however,  the  opposite  result.  The  Guard  Corps  had,  it  is  true,  full 
opportunity  for  the  display  of  its  fighting  prowess,  but  the  Saxon  corps  eventu 
ally  was  found  to  be  in  the  place  for  bringing  about  the  final  decision  at  Saint 
Privat. 

The  official  account  published  by  the  German  general  staff  in  1873  glossed 
over  to  some  extent  the  desperate  situation  of  the  Guard  Corps  before  the 
arrival  of  the  Saxons,  but  rendered  substantial  justice  to  the  Saxons: 

Both  (Prince  George  of  Saxony  and  Crown  Prince  Albert)  had  the  intention 
of  first  securing  the  occupation  of  Roncourt  and  then  advancing  to  the  attack 
of  Saint  Privat.  However  some  of  the  Saxon  leaders  received  direct  informa 
tion  of  the  state  of  the  battle  at  Saint  Privat  and,  urged  to  participate  in  the 
furious  struggle  of  the  Guard  at  that  place  as  soon  as  possible,  turned  in  that 
direction.* 

Compare  the  above  with  the  following  taken  from  the  study  of  the  battle 
published  by  the  general  staff  in  1 905 : 

Lieut,  v.  Esbeck,  sent  to  find  out  where  the  XII  Corps  was,  met  the  Saxon 
infantry  advancing  west  of  the  small  wood  between  Roncourt  and  Montois  la 
Montagne.  ...  He  reported  to  the  regimental  commander  that  the  Guard 
urgently  needed  support  in  flank.  .  .  .  Through  the  efforts  of  Lieut, 
v.  Esbeck  a  total  of  five  and  a  half  battalions  turned  out  of  the  Saxon  attacking 
line  towards  Saint  Privat,  while  the  remaining  troops  continued  in  the  direction 
of  Roncourt.  .  .  .  Lieut,  v.  Esbeck  had  no  orders  to  divert  the  march  of 
the  Saxons  towards  Saint  Privat.  He  acted  independently  under  the  impres 
sion  that  the  left  wing  of  the  ist  Guard  Infantry  Brigade  was  not  making 
headway  north  of  the  large  basin  towards  Roncourt;  it  was  anyway  not  his 
intention  to  draw  the  Saxons  away  towards  Saint  Privat  but  merely  to  hasten 
their  advance  on  Roncourt  which  he  believed  to  be  still  occupied. f 

The  contrast  between  these,  two  views  needs  no  comment.  As  an  excuse 
for  the  divergence  of  the  "  study  "  published  in  1905  from  the  history  published 
in  1873  it  has  been  alleged  that  much  new  material  had  been  brought  to  light 
in  the  meantime,  and  especially  that  much  of  value  had  been  gleaned  from 
replies  to  question  sheets  sent  out  to  participants.  Anyone  who  has  had 
any  practise  in  historical  criticism  will  readily  appreciate  the  futility  of  the 
attempt  to  reconstruct  a  history,  based  on  such  reliable  sources  as  was  the 
official  account  of  1873,  on  the  strength  of  recollections  written  thirty  years 
after  the  event. 


*Der  Krieg,  1870-71,  vol.  n,  p.  881. 
f'Der  1 8  August,  1870,"  pp.  508-9. 


II 


In  speaking  of  the  artillery  preparation  for  the  final  assault  on  Saint  Privat 
the  1873  history  says: 

The  combined  fire  of  the  Saxon  artillery  and  the  ten  Prussian  batteries, 
south  of  the  Chaussee,  was  not  long  in  showing  its  effect  on  the  village  (of 
Saint  Privat)  encumbered  with  French  troops.  .  .  .  Practically  at  the  same 
time  the  Saxons  reached  the  north  and  northwest  and  the  Guard  the  west 
and  south  of  the  burning  village.* 

Compare  with  the  above  the  laborious  effort  of  the  1905  study  to  show 
that  the  Saxon  artillery  did  not  assist  in  the  fire  preparation  for  the  assault 
on  Saint  Privat: 

When  Crown  Prince  Albert  .  .  .  observed  that  his  infantry  in  part  pro 
ceeded  towards  Saint  Privat,  after  Roncourt  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans, 
he  directed  his  artillery  to  turn  against  Saint  Privat.  This  renewed  change  of 
position  was  made  with  great  difficulty.  The  batteries  south  of  the  woods  of 
Aboue  had  not  yet  fully  deployed  in  their  position  there  when  it  became 
necessary  to  limber  up  again.  The  movement  came  to  a  standstill,  hampered 
by  the  infantry;  from  the  north  some  few  batteries  hastened  up  and  crowded 
into  the  newly  gained  firing  position.  By  the  time  order  had  been  fully 
restored  and  the  batteries  were  all  in  position  Saint  Privat  was  already  in  the 
hands  of  the  Germans. f 

The  "study"  goes  on  to  relate  that  it  was  the  Guard  who  made  the  charge 
on  Saint  Privat  from  the  north  as  well  as  from  the  west  and  south,  admitting 
that  a  few  Saxon  companies  became  mixed  in  the  charge  from  the  north  with 
a  Guard  regiment,  but  offsetting  this  with  the  statement  that  as  a  matter  of 
fact  the  troops  charging  from  the  south  were  the  first  to  reach  the  village. 

After  thus  robbing  the  Saxon  corps  of  all  credit  of  participating  in  the  attack 
on  Saint  Privat,  in  a  manner  scarcely  creditable  to  a  press  agent,  the  "study" 
awards  the  Saxons  these  few  damning  words  of  faint  praise : 

But  from  all  this  the  conclusion  should  not  be  drawn  that  the  envelopment 
by  the  XII  Corps  was  entirely  barren  of  results.  A  movement  against  a 
flank  always  has  a  certain  moral  effect  on  the  defender  even  if  he  has  employed 
sufficient  means  to  meet  it;  he  still  feels  the  threatening  of  his  line  of  retreat. J 

One  unacquainted  with  German  conditions  will  at  once  ask:  Would  the 
Saxon  officers  still  living  who  participated  in  this  battle  remain  silent  in  the 
face  of  these  statements,  even  when  made  from  an  official  source,  were  they 
not  true?  Reference  to  the  Saxon  newspapers  of  the  years  1906-7  will  show 
that  they  were  not  allowed  to  pass  unchallenged.  The  fact  that  the  denials 
were  mainly  anonymous  points  to  the  fact  that  a  German  army  officer  is  not 
allowed  to  contradict  the  "official  view." 

This  domination  of  the  official  view  is  further  indicated  by  the  storm  of 
official  protest  and  anger  over  the  publication  of  the  "War  Letters"  of  General 
Kretschman,  edited  by  his  daughter,  Lily  Braun.  These  letters  mention 
certain  plundering  and  excesses  committed  by  German  troops  on  the  field  of 
battle,  but  worst  of  all,  from  the  official  viewpoint,  the  fact  that  the  now 
famous  cavalry  charges  made  on  the  i6th  of  August,  1870,  were  not  undertaken 
willingly  by  the  cavalry  leaders,  but  only  after  stormy  protests  and  every 

*Der  Krieg,  1870-71,  vol.  2,  p.  890. 
tDer  18  August,  1870,  p.  524. 
llbid.,  p.  565- 


12 

possible  attempt  to  evade  the  order  to  charge.  The  editor  tells  us  in  the 
preface  to  the  second  edition,  published  in  1904  a  few  months  after  the  first, 
that  she  had  been  publicly  but  falsely  accused  by  her  cousin,  a  lieutenant  in 
the  army,  of  having  insulted  her  father  in  his  grave  by  violating  his  written 
instructions  to  have  his  personal  correspondence  burned  upon  his  death, 
while  so  eminent  an  authority  as  General  Boguslawski,  in  reviewing  the  work, 
said  that  twenty-five  or  thirty  letters  should  have  been  omitted  for  decency's 
sake  and  quoted  as  applicable  to  the  editor  the  saying  of  the  Duke  of  Biron, 
as  he  stepped  up  to  the  guillotine:  "I  have  been  unfaithful  to  my  God,  to  my 
king,  and  to  my  people." 

Thus  may  be  realized  how  serious  in  Germany  is  the  offense  of  contra 
dicting  the  official  history.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  higher  officers  under 
stand  quite  well  the  lack  of  value  of  the  official  history  as  history  and  look 
elsewhere  when  they  wish  to  study  their  own  wars. 

Time  will  not  permit  an  examination  of  the  work  of  the  French  general 
staff  historical  section.  In  some  ways  it  is  superior  to  the  work  of  the  German 
general  staff,  but  it  is  still  far  from  being  satisfactory,  as  historical  work. 

We  have  enough,  however,  to  give  an  answer  to  the  question  why  military 
history  is  in  disrepute:  it  is  because  those  in  exclusive  control  of  the  main 
sources  either  do  not  know  how  to  use,  or  for  some  reason  will  not  use 
them  intelligently  to  write  military  history. 

When  we  come  to  the  field  of  our  own  military  history  we  find  a  numerous 
bibliography  rich  in  pretentious  and  controversial  work  but  singularly  lacking 
in  works  of  merit,  because  no  one  equipped  with  a  working  knowledge  of 
historical  method  and  the  necessary  technical  knowledge  of  war  has  yet 
presented  us  with  any  considerable  work  on  our  own  campaigns. 

Much  can  be  done  by  the  American  Historical  Association,  by  our  universi 
ties,  and  by  the  establishment  of  a  magazine  devoted  to  military  history  to 
remedy  this  situation,  but  I  do  not  believe  a  real  solution  of  the  problem  can 
be  found  which  leaves  out  of  consideration  the  establishment  of  an  historical 
section  of  our  general  staff.  Certain  fundamental  work,  such  as  the  establish 
ment  of  the  basic  data  relative  to  the  strength,  organization  and  armament 
of  armies  as  well  as  the  preparation  of  reliable  maps,  can  only  be  accomplished 
in  this  way. 

To  argue  that  the  establishment  of  such  a  section  would  give  rise  to  addi 
tional  works  of  partisanship  is  inadmissible  because  the  section  could  have 
no  possible  reason  for  such  partisanship.  Nor  could  our  government  have 
any  possible  objection  to  a  clear  statement  of  the  whole  truth  of  every  period 
of  our  own  military  history  as  well  as  that  of  other  nations. 

It  is,  of  course,  possible  that  incompetent  officers  might  be  assigned  to 
this  work,  but  against  that  the  best  safeguard  would  be  the  close  cooperation 
and  interest  of  the  American  Historical  Association  in  the  work,  which  would 
make  the  assignment  of  such  an  officer  "for  political  reasons  "an  impossibility. 

THE  CHAIRMAN:  I  suppose  we  all  realize  that  everyone  of  us  here  present 
is  a  potential  soldier,  that  we  are  all  liable  in  the  last  resort  to  be  called  into 
the  service  of  our  country,  and  under  the  new  conditions  which  are  coming 
over  the  country  those  who  cannot  shoulder  the  musket  must  at  least  have  the 
red  cross  bound  upon  their  arms,  and  the  time  is  possibly  coming  when  every 
young  man,  as  he  approaches  age,  will  have  the  opportunity  of  proving  that 
he  can  be  a  soldier  by  a  brief  military  service  under  the  flag  of  his  country. 


13 

A  representative  of  the  militia,  who  has  had  considerable  service  and  expe 
rience  in  the  state  militia  of  New  York,  is  present,  and  I  am  going  to  call  next 
upon  Mr.  Oswald  Villard,  editor  of  the  New  York  Evening  Post. 

MR.  ViivivARD  said: 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  was  not  aware  that  any  such  position  was  assigned 
to  me  in  this  discussion  or  that  it  would  partake  of  so  formal  a  nature,  and  so 
I  must  say  that  I  have  not  prepared  any  formal  paper,  as  the  gentlemen  have 
done  who  have  preceded  me.  My  interest  in  the  matter  is  not  as  a  former 
militiaman,  nor  altogether  as  a  student  of  current  military  affairs,  but  as  one 
who  has  tried  somewhat  to  write  history  and  hopes  to  do  something  more  along 
the  line  of  military  history  in  the  years  to  come. 

As  I  have  listened  to  the  discussion  here  the  question  has  come  to  me  as  to 
whether  we  were  not  discussing  two  separate  things,  whether  the  ideals  that 
some  of  us  have  in  view  are  not  so  different  from  those  of  the  military  gentlemen 
who  are  present  as  to  make  it  impossible  for  us  to  unite.  Is  there  not  a  different 
conception  of  ideas  on  the  part  of  gentlemen  like  Captain  Conger?  Do  they 
not  confine  in  their  minds  the  study  of  military  history  to  the  technical  purpose 
of  preparing  military  men  to  take  command  in  the  field?  Is  their  desire  not 
to  write  history  from  the  point  of  view  of  instruction  in  tactics  and  strategy 
and  eulogy,  whereas  those  of  us  who  are  interested  in  the  study  of  history  as 
a  purely  historical  study  are  interested  from  the  broader  point  of  view  of  the 
national  life,  of  the  setting  forth  of  the  actual  occurrences  of  the  past,  with  less 
attention  to  detail?  In  Mr.  Roosevelt's  remarkable  address*  last  night  he 
appealed  for  a  broader  view,  a  more  interesting  treatment  and  more  vital 
treatment  of  history.  Can  we  expect  from  official  sources,  at  least  that  treat 
ment  of  the  general  subject  of  history  which  I  think  most  of  us  will  agree 
Mr.  Roosevelt  is  the  leader  of  among  our  historians?  Take  the  question  of 
the  preparation  of  American  history  by  the  American  general  staff.  That, 
it  seems  to  me,  would  invariably  lead  to  the  writing  of  history  from  one  partic 
ular  point  of  view,  perhaps  from  a  predetermined  point  of  view.  I  am  prob 
ably  at  the  other  extreme  from  Captain  Conger;  I  am  a  peace  man  and  almost 
a  peace-at-any-price  man;  I  am  not  one  who  can  subscribe  to  the  doctrine 
that  war  is  necessary  in  the  future  or  that  we  must  produce  soldiers  in  order 
to  prevent  it.  Heaven  forbid!  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  gentlemen  who  are 
engaged  in  the  military  profession  and  who  are  most  honorably  inspired  with 
eal  to  improve  that  profession,  to  elevate  it  in  this  country,  to  dignify  it,  would 
necessarily,  from  their  very  position  in  the  military  profession,  have  a  bias? 
Will  they  not  necessarily  develop  their  history  from  the  point  of  view  of  proving 
that  the  country  needs  to  do  this  or  that  in  order  to  defend  itself,  in  order  to 
avert  this  threatening  degradation  that  may  come  to  us  if  some  other  nation 
should  impose  its  will  upon  our  will?  These  are  matters  that  I  would  like 
to  have  submitted  to  you  for  your  considereation. 

The  general  staff  is  a  comparatively  new  institution.  Lest  you  think  that 
I  am  unfriendly  to  it  I  would  like  to  make  the  personal  statement  that  I 
believe  I  was  the  first  editor  in  this  country  to  advocate  the  establishment 
of  a  general  staff,  more  than  twenty  years  ago,  and  I  have  always  been  friendly 
to  the  idea.  The  fact  is,  however,  that  the  development  of  the  general  staff 


*History  as  Literature;  an  address  by  Theodore  Roosevelt,  President  of  the 
American  Historical  Association,  Symphony  Hall,  Boston,  December  27,  1912. 


14 

has  disappointed  many  of  its  friends,  and  that  is  not  so  much  due,  it  seems  to 
us,  to  the  men  who  have  composed  it,  who  have  been  the  flower  of  the  service, 
as  to  certain  conditions  under  which  they  operate.  Congress  has  felt  some 
what  dissatisfied  with  the  way  it  has  been  conducted ;  at  least,  one  may  deduce 
that  from  the  fact  that  in  the  last  session  of  Congress  the  general  staff  was 
decreased  and  may  be  still  further  decreased.  It  has  shown  a  certain  tendency 
to  mix  in  with  political  affairs,  to  lay  down  the  law  to  Congress,  whether  rightly 
or  wrongly,  it  has  seemed  to  do  so,  and  Congress  has  resented  it.  The  future 
of  that  institution  therefore  is  obviously  open  to  question.  It  is  a  fact  in 
military  history  that  General  Sherman  found  it  necessary,  because  of  his 
relations  with  the  politicians  and  Congress,  to  transfer  the  army  headquarters 
from  Washington  to  St.  Louis.  Conditions  in  the  War  Department  had 
become  so  intolerable  as  to  make  that  necessary.  It  is  not  an  impossible 
thought  that  at  some  future  time  it  may  be  advisable,  both  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  politicians  and  of  the  general  staff,  to  transfer  the  activities  of 
that  body  away  from  Washington,  perhaps  to  Fort  Leavenworth  or  some  other 
army  school,  like  West  Point. 

The  detail  to  the  general  staff  is,  as  you  are  aware,  for  a  period  of  four  years. 
Under  the  recent  law  passed  by  Congress  at  the  past  session  that  law  is  being 
rigidly  enforced  and  no  man  -can  serve  again  with  the  general  staff  unless  he 
has  spent  a  certain  amount  of  time  with  his  regiment  or  corps,  as  the  case  may 
be.  That  in  itself  would,  it  seems  to  me,  make  against  the  writing  of  scientific 
history  in  the  War  Department. 

A  section  of  the  general  staff,  it  has  always  seemed  to  me,  interested  in  the 
preparation  of  history,  the  writing  of  history,  can  perform  a  very  great  service 
by  developing  the  instruction  at  the  service  schools,  as  it  is  already  doing  at 
West  Point  particularly,  in  the  teaching  of  the  men  in  the  service  how  to  write. 
That,  after  all,  is  the  fundamental  thing.  Professor  Johnston  has  pointed  out 
in  his  paper  that  certain  qualifications  are  necessary  to  the  military  student 
as  to  the  historian,  and  one  of  those  is  that  he  shall  learn  how  to  write.  Now 
the  service  has  produced  certain  great  writers,  even  in  recent  years,  without 
referring  again  to  Sherman  or  Sheridan  or  Grant.  I  might  point  more  particu 
larly  to  Herbert  Sargent  and  others  and  John  Bigelow,  Jr.,  who  have  shown 
that  they  can  treat  this  subject;  but  the  mass  of  the  men  who  come  out  of 
West  Point  are  not  as  well  equipped  even  to  record  their  observations  as  they 
ought  to  be. 

Finally,  I  sincerely  hope  that  out  of  this  conference  there  will  grow  a  civilian 
national  society  for  the  study  of  military  history,  free  from  any  violence,  from 
any  prejudgment.  I  think  that  if  I  should  attempt  to  write  history  from  my 
peace-loving  point  of  view  I  should  reflect  discredit  upon  Professor  Hart,  from 
whom  I  have  learned  what  little  I  know  about  historical  writing.  That,  it 
seems  to  me,  is  not  the  right  way  to  go  at  it,  any  more  than  it  would  be  to  start 
off  with  the  theory  that  we  have  got  always  to  carry  on  war  or  that  we  must 
demonstrate  that  present  conditions  are  not  what  they  ought  to  be,  from  our 
individual  point  of  view.  History  is  history  and  the  recording  of  facts  pre 
cisely  as  we  see  them,  and  the  culling  of  truths  is,  after  all,  what  historians 
are  after.  I  hope  we  can  form  a  society  which  will  raise  a  structure,  which 
will  reach  those  of  us  who  are  moving  in  that  direction  how  we  may  proceed, 
which  will  lead  to  an  interchange  of  ideas,  and  which  will  have  as  its  members 
the  distinguished  military  gentlemen  who  are  here  to-day;  and  they  can  help 
us,  I  am  sure,  as  I  think  we  can  help  them. 


15 

THE  CHAIRMAN:  The  biographer  of  John  Brown,  a  rigorous  biographer,  an 
impartial  biographer,  yet  a  sympathetic  biographer,  may  simply  be  considered 
to  represent  both  peace  and  war  at  such  a  conference.  We  have  every  shade 
of  opinion  and  point  of  view  in  a  conference  of  this  kind,  and  nothing  can  be 
more  enlightening  in  the  way  of  a  searchlight  than  a  talk  like  that  which  Mr. 
Villard  throws  upon  the  subject  from  his  point  of  view. 

I  am  going  next  to  call  upon  the  man  among  us  who  I  suppose  has  had  most 
actual  experience  in  the  military  art,  namely,  Col.  T.  Iv.  Livermore,  retired, 
U.  S.  Army. 

COLONEL  LIVERMORE  said : 

Mr.  Chairman,  ladies,  and  gentlemen,  it  is  a  great  surprise  and  a  great 
pleasure  to  me  to  be  here,  to  be  called  upon  to  take  part  in  a  conference  upon 
military  history,  a  branch  in  which  I  have  always  been  interested  and  which 
I  believe  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  branches  of  history.  I  was  absent 
from  town  at  the  time  this  was  started  and  I  know  nothing  of  the  purpose  of 
this  meeting  except  what  I  have  gathered  from  Professor  Johnston  since  I 
arrived,  through  the  papers  which  he  handed  me,  which  were  published  in  the 
INFANTRY  JOURNAL,  one  by  himself  and  one  by  the  editor. 

It  was  a  great  pleasure  to  me  to  know  that  the  meeting  was  to  be  called 
here  in  this  hall,  this  hall  which  Mr.  Ropes  established  for  the  purposes  of 
military  history.  Most  of  us  know  that  twenty  or  thirty  years  ago  the 
Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts  was  established  and  for  a  long 
time  met  at  his  house,  where  he  was  in  the  habit  of  inviting  once  a  month  some 
distinguished  Confederate  or  Federal  commander,  and,  after  a  jovial  dinner, 
they  would  read  papers  and  we  would  all  discuss  them  there  at  his  house. 
Afterwards  this  hall  was  built,  mainly  at  Mr.  Ropes'  expense,  and  dedicated 
to  this  purpose.  ...  In  these  meetings,  although  we  didn't  always  arrive 
at  the  exact  truth,  we  learned  more  than  we  probably  could  have  learned 
otherwise  from  the  way  in  which  the  subjects  were  viewed  by  many  of  the 
principal  actors  and  of  what  they  thought  of  the  motives  that  prompted  the 
movements  and  the  results  of  those  movements.  In  the  memoirs  of  the 
society  many  of  these  were  published  and  furnished  valuable  contributions  as 
material  for  military  history.  .  .  .  It  is  therefore  peculiarly  appropriate  that 
a  conference  which  has  for  its  object  cooperation  in  writing  military  history 
should  have  its  meeting  here.  I  am  also  very  glad  indeed  to  see  officers  from 
the  War  College  and  from  the  service  schools  present  here  and  taking  an  interest 
in  the  subject. 

For  more  than  thirty  years  I  have  urged  strongly  upon  the  War  Department 
and  upon  the  generals  commanding  the  Army  the  establishment  of  a  general 
staff,  and  especially  of  a  military  historical  section  of  such  general  staff.  After 
wards,  when  the  general  staff  was  about  to  be  organized,  I  recommended 
informally  a  military  historical  section  to  that  body.  What  we  have  heard 
from  these  papers  today  tends  to  confirm  what  I  thought  then  of  the  impor 
tance  of  the  subject.  Military  history  is  not  only  one  of  the  most  important 
branches  of  military  science,  but  it  may  be  regarded  as  the  basis  of  military 
science.  The  rules  of  strategy  and  grand  tactics  are  either  based  upon  or 
checked  up  by  military  history  in  its  broadest  sense.  To  know  what  we  can 
do  under  certain  circumstances  we  must  know  what  other  men  did  under 
similar  circumstances  before.  Considering  what  has  been  said  in  the  papers 
that  I  have  heard  and  from  what  I  have  learned  of  the  purposes  of  this  meeting, 


i6 

with  which  I  am  in  general  agreement,  I  think  I  can  express  my  views  better 
by  reading  a  few  extracts  from  the  introduction  to  a  volume  which  I  am  now 
publishing  in  continuation  of  Mr.  Ropes'  "Story  of  the  Civil  War." 

A  large  part  of  all  the  history  that  has  been  written  relates  in  some  way  to 
military  operations.  In  the  opinion  of  many  historians  to-day,  the  condition  of 
the  people,  their  physical,  intellectual,  moral  and  industrial  development, 
especially  in  time  of  peace,  are  the  only  subjects  worthy  of  their  consideration. 
Under  the  present  conditions,  however,  peace,  compatible  with  the  demands 
of  prosperity,  honor  and  morality,  can  be  maintained  only  by  due  preparation 
for  war.  The  one  great  object  of  war  is  peace.  If  the  history  of  three  thousand 
years  does  not  show  that  no  lasting  peace  is  worth  having  that  is  not  based 
upon  the  ability  to  fight,  at  least  half  of  such  history  has  been  written  in  vain. 
Warfare  is  barbarous.  It  may  be  inhuman.  All  nations  should  disarm,  but 
in  proper  sequence.  When  all  are  armed  and  prepared  in  the  proportion  in 
which  we  would  wish  them  to  prosper,  let  all  be  disarmed  in  the  same  proportion 
and  as  promptly  as  possible. 

The  present  period  is  one  of  rapid  development.  In  the  struggle  for  exist 
ence,  great  nations  are  crowding  upon  each  other.  Universal  peace  will  not  be 
possible  until  conflicting  interests  shall  have  been  adjusted.  All  nations  but 
our  own  are  preparing  for  defense.  By  neglecting  to  bear  our  share  of  the 
burden,  we  are  insulting  the  rest  of  the  civilized  world  upon  whom  we  now  rely 
for  our  safety  in  the  hope  that  each  nation  will  hold  the  other  in  check,  and 
save  us  from  all  trouble  and  expense.  ...  If  we  take  the  proper  measures 
for  self-defense,  weaker  nations  will  gather  around  us  and  add  to  our  strength. 

The  history  of  the  Civil  War  is  useful  in  keeping  alive  the  military  interest 
of  the  present  generation  so  that  the  next  may  have  some  civil  history  to  record. 
It  shows  that  our  armies,  on  both  sides,  endured  as  much  and  fought  as  bravely 
as  any  in  the  world.  The  troops  showed,  perhaps,  more  self-reliance  and  more 
capacity  for  the  individual  action  demanded  by  the  warfare  of  to-day  than 
those  of  any  great  army  of  ancient  or  modern  times.  The  federal  armies  were 
finally  victorious;  but  hundreds  of  thousands  of  lives  and  incalculable  priva 
tions  and  sufferings  would  have  been  spared  if  the  nation  had  been  prepared 
for  war,  if  the  federal  armies  had  been  better  trained  and  their  operations 
more  skilfully  conducted.  The  lack  of  training  and  discipline  was  not  so 
apparent,  because  both  armies  suffered  from  it,  though  perhaps  not  always  to 
the  same  degree.  With  regard  to  the  conduct  of  grand  operations,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  military  training  of  the  generals  had  mainly  been  con 
fined  to  the  life  in  a  small  post  with  one  or  two  companies;  perhaps  they  had 
never  expected  to  take  part  in  a  greater  war  than  that  just  concluded  with 
Mexico.  In  almost  any  war  whose  operations  can  be  thoroughly  analyzed  it 
will  be  found  that  much  is  lost  from  bad  troop-leading  which  could  have  been 
saved  if  the  same  attention  had  been  given  heretofore  as  now  to  practise  in 
time  of  peace,  on  the  map  and  in  the  field,  of  the  application  of  military  prin 
ciples  to  the  varied  exigencies  of  a  campaign  and  a  battle. 

From  the  history  of  the  campaigns  and  battles  of  our  Civil  War,  one  can 
learn  much,  not  because  those  campaigns  and  battles  were  always  well  con 
ducted,  but  because  they  gave  rise  to  so  many  military  situations,  each  one  of 
which  offers  a  useful  field  for  the  study  of  military  problems.  We  are  more 
concerned  now  in  learning  what  should  have  been  done  in  each  case  than  in 
deciding  who  was  most  to  blame  for  not  doing  it. 

Nearly  half  a  century  has  passed  since  the  battle  of  Gettysburg ;  twenty-four 
centuries  since  the  battle  of  Marathon.  In  many  respects  the  art  of  war  has 
changed  more  from  Gettysburg  to  the  present  time,  than  from  Marathon  to 
Gettysburg.  To  study  the  dispositions  and  movements  of  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg  with  a  view  to  copying  them  now  might  prove  to  be  a  fatal  error.  To 
draw  up  an  army  of  85,000  men  on  open  ground  on  a  line  of  three  or  four  miles 
in  length  with  an  average  depth  of  nine  or  ten  solid  ranks,  and  in  the  presence 
of  a  hostile  army  of  nearly  equal  strength,  would  be  to  deliver  it  over  to  cap 
tivity  or  slaughter.  The  human  factors,  however,  have  not  changed;  and 
even  the  forms  are  not  so  different  as  the  dimensions. 


17: 

The  narrative  of  this  volume  has  been  based  as  far  as  possible  upon  the 
official  record.  It  is  a  common  impression  that  the  reports  in  themselves 
convey  intelligible  and  detailed  accounts  of  the  operations,  and  that  the  his 
torian  has  only  to  select  from  these  such  material  as  he  may  need  for  his  narra 
tive.  Most  of  them,  however,  convey  no  definite  idea  of  the  position  of  the 
troops  to  any  one  but  the  officers  to  whom  they  were  addressed;  and  many 
have  by  themselves  no  value  whatever  to  the  historian.  Yet,  by  repeatedly 
comparing  each  with  other  reports  and  with  other  evidence,  by  the  aid  of 
the  detailed  maps  of  the  battle-fields,  a  military  expert  can  learn  where  almost 
every  regiment  was  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  a  campaign  or  a  battle. 
This  is  almost  the  only  great  war  for  which  this  would  be  possible.  The 
official  record  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  is  extensively  consulted  at  home 
and  abroad,  and  of  late  years  especially  in  England,  where  its  value  is  now 
fairly  understood. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  references  and  maps  in  this  volume  will  serve  as  a  key 
to  make  the  reports  more  intelligible.  Besides  the  official  reports,  many 
accounts  have  been  written  by  the  commanders  on  each  side  and  by  others 
who  took  part  in  the  war.  Some  of  these  are  very  valuable;  but  if  not  based 
upon  memoranda  made  at  the  time,  such  accounts  are  not  to  be  taken  without 
caution  as  reliable  original  evidence.  The  most  conscientious  narrator  finds 
after  a  short  lapse  of  time  that  his  recollections  have  been  colored  by  the  con 
ceptions  based,  more  or  less  unconsciously,  upon  the  accounts  and  the  discussion 
of  others.  .  .  . 

An  estimate  of  the  strength  and  losses  of  each  army  in  each  campaign  and 
battle  has  been  tabulated.  The  positions  of  the  opposing  troops  from  month 
to  month  in  campaign,  and  from  hour  to  hour  in  battle,  have  been  so  expressed 
by  a  series  of  maps  as  to  show  at  a  glance  the  general  course  of  the  operations; 
and  what  each  prominent  commander  said  and  thought  about  the  situation 
from  time  to  time,  and  his  plans  for  meeting  it,  are  told  in  the  text,  so  that  the 
reader  may  have  before  him  the  data  on  which  to  base  his  own  judgment  with 
out  reference  to  the  comments  which  follow. 

Only  a  professional  soldier  would  care,  perhaps,  to  make  an  exhaustive 
analysis  of  a  battle;  but  the  results  are  valuable  to  the  general  historian,  and 
full  of  interest  to  the  untechnical  reader. 

In  Professor  Johnston's  paper  he  comments  upon  the  fragmentary  nature  of 
the  knowledge  in  regard  to  the  Civil  War  and  says,  for  example,  "Who  knows 
what  was  done?  Who  knows  what  was  done  when  Grant  made  his  campaign 
around  Vicksburg?"  and  he  speaks  of  several  other  instances.  I  have  had  in 
mind  to  point  out  that  error,  in  this  volume  which  is  just  appearing,  and  in 
describing  the  campaign  at  Vicksburg  I  have  given  a  map  for  the  movements  of 
the  armies  for  each  and  every  day  when  there  was  any  considerable  movement, 
from  Grant's  first  movement  until  the  battle  of  Champion  Hills.  In  the  battle 
of  Champion  Hills  I  have  shown  the  position  of  every  regiment  every  hour 
and  sometimes  every  half-hour  until  the  engagement  was  finished.  The  same 
thing  is  true  of  the  battle  of  Big  Black  Ridge.  In  the  assault  on  Vicksburg 
I  have  shown  on  the  plan  where  each  regiment  was  at  each  stage  of  the  assault. 
This  I  have  tried  to  do  for  all  the  operations,  and  it  is  in  this  way  especially, 
t  seems  to  me,  that  the  general  staff  could  be  of  material  advantage,  material 
help,  to  historians  of  the  country  at  large.  There  are,  as  we  have  learned  from 
the  other  papers,  many  civilian  historians  all  through  the  country,  who  would 
be  glad  to  write  of  the  Civil  War  if  they  only  knew  what  they  were  writing 
about,  if  they  only  knew  where  the  troops  were. 

I  don't  at  all  agree  with  the  last  speaker  if  he  meant  to  imply  that  military 
officers  couldn't  write  history  without  taking  one  side.  I  think  I  may  have 
misunderstood  the  purport  of  his  speech,  but  in  any  event  I  am  sure  that  they 
could,  and  it  is  quite  possible  for  them  to  furnish  not  only  that  information 


which  is  so  valuable,  and  to  which  Captain  Conger  referred,  but  also  all  these 
data  as  to  the  position  of  troops  from  time  to  time,  the  strength  of  regiments, 
and  so  forth,  which  would  serve  as  a  foundation  for  historical  writing  by 
civilians. 

Now,  as  regards  the  general  purpose  of  this  meeting,  I  am  decidedly  in  favor 
of  the  formation  of  a  military  historical  society,  a  national  military  historical 
society.  I  think  the  interest  is  gieat  enough  in  it  and  I  think  our  people  are 
waking  up  to  the  necessity  that  they  will  have  to  take  a  livelier  interest  than 
they  have  been  taking  in  military  matters,  and  I  am  very  glad  to  see  that  it 
has  taken  its  start  here. 

THE  CHAIRMAN:  We  are  all  indebted  to  Colonel  Livermore,  who  both  in 
actual  service  and  as  a  retired  officer  has  so  singularly  devoted  himself  to  this 
question  of  military  history.  There  are  two  representatives  of  the  Army  to 
whom  we  shall  shortly  listen.  Before  we  listen  to  them  I  want  to  call  for  the 
views  of  Professor  F.  M.  Fling  of  the  University  of  Nebraska. 

PROFESSOR  FLING  said : 

Mr.  Chairman,  ladies,  and  gentlemen,  I  came  in  here  simply  as  a  listener 
and  did  not  know  until  Professor  Hart  spoke  to  me  that  I  would  be  called  upon 
to  talk  at  all.  What  I  shall  say  has  been  suggested  to  me  by  the  discussion. 
It  seems  to  me  that  we  are  confounding  some  things  here  that  should  be  kept 
apart.  I  can't  see  that  this  question  as  to  whether  we  are  peace  men  or  war 
men — I  am  a  peace  man  myself  and  might  disagree  with  my  good  friend 
Captain  Conger,  because  I  think  peace  is  within  practical  reach — I  can't  see 
that  that  has  anything  to  do  with  military  history.  History  has  to  be  of  the 
past  and  not  of  the  future.  And  whatever  we  may  think  of  the  future  there 
is  no  question  that  there  has  been  a  great  deal  of  fighting  done  in  the  past. 
The  business  of  the  historian  deals  with  the  entire  past.  The  idea  of  the  older 
generation  was  that  it  was  to  deal  with  political  history,  but  that  has  been 
pretty  well  exploded  since  Freeman's  day.  Fighting  has  been  a  large  part  of 
the  history  of  the  past  and  we  are  obliged  to  deal  with  it. 

Now  the  question  is,  it  seems  to  me,  if  we  are  going  to  deal  with  it:  Who  is 
to  deal  with  it?  And  you  will  note  that  Captain  Conger  gave  a  great  deal  of 
time  and  attention  in  his  paper  to  the  official  histories.  I  think  that  was 
misunderstood  by  some  of  you  here.  His  purpose  was  to  show  how  it  was  done 
by  the  official  bureau,  and  to  show  that  it  may  be  an  unwise  thing  at  the  present 
time — perhaps  at  any  time — to  put  the  writing  of  history  into  an  official 
bureau;  and  his  illustrations,  it  seemed  to  me,  taken  from  the  work  of  the 
German  staff  or  its  historical  section,  were  rather  convincing.  On  the  other 
hand,  I  don't  think  he  intended  to  convey  the  idea  that  history  should  not  be 
written  by  military  men.  I  believe  it  should;  I  believe  that  it  should  be 
written  by  a  man  who  is  a  military  man,  who  knows  what  war  means  techni 
cally,  who  has  been  through  enough  experience  to  know  what  it  is  like,  and  at 
the  same  time  has  had  a  training  technically  and  historically.  That,  I  think, 
is  the  weak  side  of  a  good  deal  of  military  history.  It  is  not  sufficient  for  a 
man  to  know  his  subject-matter.  I  think,  again,  that  on  the  other  hand 
civilians  make  a  mistake  when  they  think  that  history  cannot  be  written  by 
the  army  man,  because  the  army  man  has  in  mind  the  application  of  things. 
You  can't  apply  a  thing  effectively  until  you  know  it.  Now,  the  man  who 
is  properly  trained  as  a  military  man  and  as  a  historian  knows  that  if  his 


19 

military  history  is  to  be  of  any  use  to  him  whatever  he  must  approach  it  from 
an  independent  point  of  view  with  the  effort  to  discover  exactly  what  took 
place.  When  he  knows  that  he  can  consider  what  use  he  can  make  of  it.  If 
he  approaches  it  simply  from  the  point  of  view  of  utilizing  certain  things  he 
never  really  gets  at  the  truth.  First  let  us  know  what  the  truth  is  and  then 
the  military  man  can  understand  what  he  can  do. 

This  idea  of  pragmatic  effort — and  I  think  there  has  been  a  good  deal  of 
that  suggested  this  morning — is  really  an  outgrown  stage.  The  teaching  of 
history  is  a  thing  which  we  may  concern  ourselves  with  if  we  know  what  history 
is.  Teaching  is  not  good  for  much  unless  we  approach  the  subject  from  a 
scientific,  unbiased  point  of  view,  determined  to  know  the  truth,  whatever 
it  may  be.  It  may  be  useful  or  it  may  not,  but  that  is  not  the  question. 

Now  there  is  no  doubt  that  we  have  got  a  large  chance  to  write  military 
history  in  this  country.  I  am  not  a  specialist  in  United  States  history  or  the 
history  of  the  Civil  War,  but  I  know  enough  about  the  situation  from  my  own 
reading  and  conversation  with  military  men  who  have  been  doing  some  work 
upon  it  to  know  that  we  are  hardly  at  the  beginning  of  the  work,  and  the  real 
trouble  has  been  that  for  the  most  part,  no  matter  how  good  our  men  have 
been  as  military  men,  they  didn't  know  how  to  write  history,  they  didn't 
know  how  to  review  it,  didn't  know  what  the  historical  process  was.  That  is 
the  first  point. 

Now  men  have  attempted  to  write  a  history  of  the  Civil  War;  even  one 
man  has  attempted  it,  and  about  all  one  man  could  do  in  his  lifetime  would 
be  to  write  in  a  successful  way  the  history  of  one  campaign.  That  is  the 
trouble  with  our  historical  writing;  it  isn't  peculiar  with  military  historical 
writing,  but  it  is  the  trouble  with  history  from  beginning  to  end.  Men  have 
been  writing  the  history  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  we  haven't  a  decent 
history  of  the  French  Revolution  to-day,  though  it  was  more  than  one  hundred 
years  ago,  because  men  were  not  satisfied  to  do  what  they  could  do  and  lay 
a  foundation  for  a  synthesis,  or  to  undertake  exhaustive  work  upon  the  topic 
that  might  lay  a  foundation  for  a  synthesis. 

The  attitude  of  the  public  is  a  discouraging  one;  it  is  constantly  discouraging 
scientific  work,  constantly  discouraging  detail  work.  We  can't  have  a  sound 
general  history  until  we  have  established  a  reliable  foundation  upon  which 
the  details  can  rest  and  on  which  the  men  who  can  use  the  synthesis  can  build 
their  structure.  But  until  those  foundations  are  laid,  those  books  written, 
no  one  can  write  a  large  synthesis.  I  don't  believe  that  good  historical  work 
can  ever  be  done  in  a  practical  way  of  the  Civil  War  until  a  group  of  well- 
trained  men — first  of  all,  to  my  mind,  military  men  who  know  the  subject- 
matter  and  know  what  the  details  must  mean — have  got  together. 

In  the  second  place,  in  order  to  write  history  it  must  be  handled  independ 
ently;  the  material  that  we  have  been  working  upon  must  be  handled  inde 
pendently  upon  the  details,  independently  upon  the  different  campaigns,  in 
order  to  make  this  larger  synthesis  possible.  The  question  is,  how  is  that  to 
be  done?  I  don't  believe  the  universities  are  going  to  do  very  much  of  that. 
I  am  interested  in  this  thing  and  I  had  hoped  that  Captain  Conger  would  say 
something  about  the  work  being  done  at  Fort  Leavenworth.  It  has  been 
interesting  to  me  ever  since  they  started  in  to  train  army  men  there  in  his 
torical  research,  studying  the  campaigns,  putting  the  sources  right  into  their 
hands,  and  showing  them  how  to  work  it  up.  I  have  been  interested  ever 


2Q 

since  they  started  and  I  have  been  down  there  and  seen  the  work  they  are  doing, 
and  I  think  there  is  a  most  promising  beginning  there  with  that  big  group  of 
the  finest  kind  of  men.  I  talked  to  a  class  one  morning  upon  historical  matters, 
and  it  was  a  real  inspiration  to  get  before  twenty-four  or  twenty-five  men  like 
that  who  fixed  their  eyes  upon  you  when  you  started  and  kept  them  there  for 
an  hour.  Picked  men  of  that  kind  can  do  something  yet,  if  we  can  get  those 
men  into  Leavenworth  under  a  competent  instructor  and  give  them  two  years 
of  that  kind  of  thing.  If  the  Army  is  simply  a  defensive  instrument  and  the 
men  have  plenty  of  idle  time  on  their  hands,  it  is  a  splendid  thing  to  work  at 
training  them  up  as  historians  and  let  them  take  all  the  points  you  are  working 
up,  and  in  a  comparatively  short  time  you  will  have  the  foundation  of  a  valu 
able  history  of  the  Civil  War,  and  I  think  you  can  get  those  results  by  the  right 
kind  of  teaching. 

I  know  the  work  being  done  and  I  know  the  broad  scale  of  it  and  I  think 
from  the  men  I  have  met  that  I  shouldn't  ask  a  finer  type  of  men,  men  who 
had  approached  the  question  of  war  from  a  historical  point  of  view  and  such 
a  well-balanced  way  as  these  men  are  getting  at  Leavenworth,  and  I  think  if 
we  can  push  that  thing  along  and  give  them  a  free  hand,  if  we  give  them  a 
chance  to  do  it  in  that  way,  historical  research  will  take  care  of  itself. 

THE  CHAIRMAN  :  It  is  a  very  gratifying  thing  to  have  with  us  here  men  who 
are  engaged  in  a  scientific  career  at  the  Army  War  College,  and  it  is  a  great 
advantage  to  us  to  be  able  to  listen  to  them.  I  take  great  pleasure  in  intro 
ducing  to  you  Maj.  J.  W.  McAndrew  of  the  Army  War  College,  who  will  be 
the  next  speaker. 

MAJOR  McANDREw  said: 

Mr.  Chairman,  ladies,  and  gentlemen,  we  thank  the  gentlemen  of  the 
American  Historical  Association  who  have  made  it  possible  for  us  to  present 
at  this  conference  the  views  of  the  Army  on  the  proper  methods  of  writing 
military  history  and  of  awakening  in  our  people  an  interest  in  its  study.  The 
Army  owes  a  debt  of  gratitude  particularly  to  Professor  Johnston  for  his 
interest  in  this  work.  What  he  has  said  and  written  shows  such  a  clear 
insight  into  the  subject  from  the  Army's  point  of  view  that  we  are  willing  to 
trust  our  case  in  his  hands  and  to  follow  the  path  he  has  already  blazed. 

This  is  an  age  when  science  directs  its  efforts  to  the  prevention  rather  than 
to  the  cure  of  the  ills  that  mankind  formerly  accepted  as  inevitable.  The 
medical  profession  aims  to  make  disease  of  the  body  impossible,  and  no  longer 
waits  for  the  disease  to  appear  before  taking  up  the  fight  against  it.  Our  best 
mechanical  skill  is  directed  towards  preventing  accidents  to  life  and  property 
rather  than  to  quick  repair  of  the  damage  done.  The  statesman  aims  at  a 
stable  government  founded  upon  the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  its  people 
and  not  at  one  founded  upon  force  and  repression.  All  this  is  in  line  with  the 
progress  of  the  human  race. 

The  greatest  aid  to  science  in  its  efforts  wholly  to  eradicate  disease  is  the 
study  of  the  history  of  the  disease  and  of  the  warfare  waged  against  it  in  all  its 
progressive  stages.  By  such  study  previous  mistakes  are  avoided  and  only 
the  most  promising  line  of  action  need  be  followed. 

If  war  be  a  disease,  it  would  serve  the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  the  human 
race  far  more  to  prevent  it  than  to  contend  with  it  only  after  its  advent. 
It  can  be  emphatically  stated  that,  contrary  to  a  widespread  belief,  neither 


21 

the  Army  nor  the  Navy  desires  war,  nor  looks  forward  to  war  as  an  ideal 
condition  for  even  the  profession  of  arms.  There  is  no  more  earnest  advocate 
of  universal  peace  than  the  soldier  who  has  seen  war.  His  abhorrence  of  this 
diseased  condition  of  the  political  body  arises  not  from  mere  sentimental 
theory,  but  from  an  adequate  conception  of  the  horrors  of  the  battlefield,  and 
of  the  frightful  toll  war  exacts  in  property  as  well  as  in  life.  As  a  practical 
man,  however,  the  study  of  his  profession  teaches  him  that  wars  cannot  be 
avoided  by  doing  away  with  armies  and  navies  any  more  than  that  crime  can 
be  prevented  by  abolishing  the  police  forces  of  our  cities.  So  long  as  the 
disease  of  war  is  latent  among  nations,  we  believe  in  having  at  hand, -the 
moment  the  disease  breaks  into  virulence,  the  remedies  and  means  to  apply 
at  once  the  treatment  that  will  bring  it  to  a  swift  and  sure  conclusion.  If  we 
are  not  prepared  to  do  this  the  ravages  of  the  disease  are  multiplied  indefinitely. 

Were  the  question  of  war  or  peace,  then,  to  rest  with  the  Army  and  the  Navy 
alone  there  could  be  no  question  that  peace  would  be  chosen.  But  if  we  read 
our  history  aright  we  must  see  that  with  us  the  Army  and  the  Navy  have  no 
voice  in  the  making  of  war,  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  war  has  been  entered 
upon  by  our  nation  against  the  counsels  of  our  best  soldiers.  Even  the  govern 
ment  that  at  the  time  controlled  the  affairs  of  the  nation  cannot  be  held  re 
sponsible  for  the  wars  that  have  come  upon  us.  It  was  the  American  people 
as  a  whole  that  forced  our  officials  into  action.  And  can  we  even  hope  that 
unbiased  historians  will  find  that  our  cause  was  always  just?  We  recognize, 
then,  the  fact  that  when  the  people  will  it  war  must  come,  and  that  in  the  ex 
citement  of  the  moment  no  stop  is  made  to  consider  whether  we  are  prepared 
or  not  or  what  the  appalling  cost  of  unpreparedness  is  to  be.  The  lessons  that 
might  have  been  learned  from  previous  wars  are  lost  to  our  people  because  they 
have  not  learned  aright  the  history  of  such  wars.  Could  we  but  educate  our 
people  on  the  darker  side  of  this  history  we  would  have  a  guarantee  for  con 
tinued  peace  that  all  the  peace  societies  of  the  world  cannot  give  us.  It  is  the 
only  way  to  prevent  the  nation  from  lightly  entering  upon  war. 

Less  than  twenty  years  ago  public  clamor  almost  forced  us  into  war  with  a 
strong  nation  far  better  prepared  for  war  than  we  were  and  far  less  vulnerable. 
The  wisest  counsels  in  the  Army  and  the  Navy  were  on  the  side  of  peace, 
since  they  fully  recognized  what  the  appalling  cost  of  such  a  war  would  be, 
a  cost  immeasurably  greater  because  of  our  unpreparedness.  But  it  was  not 
this  unpreparedness  that  averted  war  at  that  time.  We  know  how  lightly 
many  of  our  people  entered  into  war  with  a  foreign  power  in  1898.  And  we 
know  that  in  a  similar  state  of  the  public  mind,  war  would  have  been  forced 
upon  an  unwilling  administration  of  our  government  though  our  antagonist 
were  one  of  the  strongest  world  powers  and  not  one,  as  fortunately  for  us 
was  the  case  at  that  time,  as  unprepared  for  war  as  we  were. 

We  of  the  military  recognize  this  danger.  Since  we  are  not  in  a  position  to 
insist  upon  a  continuance  of  peace,  it  is  a  matter  of  patriotism  with  us  to 
endeavor  to  have  our  country  prepared  for  war.  The  danger  will  be  always 
with  us  until  the  American  people  are  taught  aright  the  military  history  of 
their  country.  So  long  as  history  teaches  only  a  part  of  the  truth,  the  lessons 
are  lost  to  them.  The  American  boy  grows  up  to  believe  that  we  need  not 
fear  to  go  to  war  with  any  nation  on  earth,  and  that  success  must  come  to  us 
without  preparation  for  the  test  of  war.  He  has  reached  this  belief  through 
the  teachings  of  a  history  that  has  magnified  our  successes  in  the  past  and  mini- 


22 

mized  or  passed  over  our  reverses;  a  history  that  told  nothing  of  the  awful 
cost  of  entering  upon  war  unprepared;  of  the  untold  suffering  and  privations 
that  such  wars  brought  to  our  people.  He  has  seen  only  the  glory  of  war, 
and  is  led  to  believe  that  for  our  country  there  is  no  dark  side  to  the  picture. 
And  when  the  boy  becomes  a  man  he  is  ready  to  clamor  for  war  when  in  a 
time  of  public  excitement  he  mistakes  frenzy  for  patriotism. 

Military  history  of  our  country,  if  written  and  taught  aright,  must  bring 
home  to  our  people  the  following  facts :  That  we  have  never  been  prepared  for 
war;  that  unpreparedness  has  not  served  to  turn  our  people  from  war  with  even 
the  strongest  nations;  that  failing  to  develop  our  military  resources  in  time  of 
peace,  we  have  been  compelled  to  squander  them  ruthlessly  when  war  came ; 
and  that  the  country  has  paid  in  every  war  an  appalling  cost  in  blood  and 
treasure.  This,  despite  the  fact  that  we  have  never  yet  waged  war  against  a 
first  class  military  power,  except  in  1812  when,  fortunately  for  us,  our  antago 
nist  had  her  attention  diverted  from  us  by  the  progress  of  events  nearer  home. 
It  would  teach  us,  moreover,  that  undeveloped  military  resources,  no  matter 
how  vast,  do  not  fit  a  nation  to  wage  successful  war,  any  more  than  the  un 
developed  material  for  a  football  team  in  a  large  university  would  enable  it 
to  compete  successfully  on  the  gridiron  with  the  highly  trained  football  team 
of  a  smaller  college. 

Military  history,  to  be  most  profitable  to  our  people,  may  minimize  our 
successes  in  past  wars  if  it  will;  but  it  must  bring  out  clearly  the  other  side  of 
the  picture  in  order  that  we  may  recognize  the  reasons  for  our  reverses  and 
profit  by  the  mistakes  we  then  made. 

In  recent  years  there  is  a  decided  improvement  in  our  school  histories  in 
that  they  teach  nothing  false.  The  trouble  is  that  while  telling  the  truth 
they  do  not  tell  the  whole  truth.  Let  us  take  the  histories  of  the  war  of  1812 
as  an  example.  No  one  can  learn  from  them  even  by  inference  the  facts  that 
in  that  war  our  reverses  far  outnumbered  our  successes,  that  in  numerous 
instances  our  hastily  formed  volunteers  behaved  disgracefully  and  that  they 
proved  generally  unreliable;  or  that  we  enlisted  ten  men  to  one  that  our 
antagonist  could  bring  against  us.  That,  after  all,  we  did  not  conquer  peace; 
that  the  best  we  can  claim  for  our  side  is  that  the  issue  was  undecided;  and 
that  had  England  not  had  her  attention  so  fully  occupied  at  the  time  in  Europe 
the  issue  would  surely  have  been  against  us — are  facts  scarcely  deducible  from 
many  histories  of  that  war. 

In  recent  years  the  nations  that  are  best  prepared  for  war  have  given  much 
time  and  attention  to  the  preparation  of  critical  military  histories  of  the 
wars  in  which  they  have  been  involved,  and  have  even  extended  their  studies 
to  include  the  wars  of  other  nations  deemed  worthy  of  study.  This  is  now 
considered  of  importance  secondary  only  to  the  work  of  preparation  for 
possible  future  wars.  It  is  essentially  the  work  of  the  general  staff  of  an  army, 
and  we  are  among  the  very  few  first  class  powers  that  have  not  taken  up  the 
work.  The  fault  of  the  omission  does  not  lie  wholly  at  the  door  of  our  general 
staff.  It  is  only  ten  years  since  the  law  gave  us  a  general  staff.  At  first 
its  efforts  were  directed  to  finding  itself,  to  determining  what  was  its  proper 
sphere,  and  then  to  doing  all  that  could  be  done  to  make  up  for  the  neglect 
of  years  in  preparing  for  possible  future  wars.  Just  at  the  time  when  our 
general  staff  might  have  taken  up  the  critical  study  of  past  American  cam 
paigns,  the  reduction  in  the  number  of  officers  assigned  to  general  staff  duty 


again  deferred  the  work.  But  our  general  staff  must  in  the  near  future  assign 
&  section  of  its  best  equipped  officers  to  this  important  work,  since  it  is  realized 
that  every  day  sees  the  loss  of  valuable  material  for  research,  and  that  errors 
once  accepted  as  facts  are  difficult  to  eradicate.  Moreover,  the  professional 
fitness  of  our  officers  is  best  advanced  by  a  study  of  a  correct  history  of  our 
past  campaigns  in  war.  In  the  meantime  our  War  College  is  devoting  part 
of  its  time  to  a  study  of  the  principal  campaigns  of  our  Civil  War,  a  study 
conducted  according  to  the  accepted  methods  of  modern  historical  research. 
This  work  is  necessarily  slow,  and  it  will  take  years  to  get  in  this  way  a  com 
plete  history  of  our  campaigns  because  the  War  College  has  other  work  to  do 
and  but  one  year  is  allotted  to  the  officers  taking  the  course  there.  But  it  has 
already  produced  some  valuable  critical  studies  of  the  campaigns  of  1861  to 
1865,  all  that  we  have  that  are  of  any  real  value  to  us. 

Of  course  much  of  this  work  is  of  technical  value  only,  and  is  intended  to 
advance  the  professional  knowledge  of  our  officers  and  not  as  a  history  for 
the  public.  It  is  doubtful  if  the  public  generally  would  show  any  interest  in 
such  purely  professional  studies  since  the  officers  who  prepared  them  were 
not  historians  in  any  sense  of  the  word.  The  professional  historian  may 
however,  accept  the  facts  brought  out  in  these  studies,  and  weave  them  into 
the  general  history  of  the  time. 

Of  the  four  qualifications  enumerated  by  Professor  Johnston  as  necessary 
for  the  equipment  of  the  writers  of  military  history,  viz.,  technical  knowledge 
of  the  military  art,  erudition,  critical  skill,  and  literary  skill,  two  may  be 
looked  for  among  soldiers  and  two  in  general  among  civilians.  It  may  be 
considered  hopeless  to  expect  to  find  them  all  combined  in  any  one  man.  It 
would  seem,  then,  that  our  military  histories  must  be  written  by  both  soldiers 
and  civilians,  since  either  class  alone  cannot  reach  the  desired  result.  There 
must  be  collaboration. 

We  must  confess  that  we  are  not  prepared  to  say  just  how  we  can  bring 
about  this  result.  We  hope  that  this  discussion  will  bring  out  some  practicable 
working  plan.  The  general  staff  of  the  Army  will  welcome  your  cooperation 
in  the  matter,  and  the  present  chief  of  staff  and  his  assistants  stand  ready 
to  further,  as  far  as  the  law  will  permit,  any  practicable  plan  that  may  be 
advanced. 

We  do  not  corne  here  asking  for  your  assistance  in  adding  a  single  regiment 
to  our  army  nor  a  single  battleship  to  our  navy.  But  we  do  ask  your  earnest 
cooperation  in  the  work  of  putting  before  the  American  people  a  full  and 
correct  military  history  of  our  country,  one  that  will  bring  home  the  lesson 
that  while  war  may  be  a  calamity  under  any  circumstances,  its  cost  in  blood 
and  treasure  is  multiplied  many  times  when  we  enter  upon  it  unprepared. 

We  believe  the  education  of  our  people  in  our  military  history  will  be  the 
best  guarantee  of  continued  peace  when  the  question  rests  with  them  whether 
there  shall  be  peace  or  war;  and  that  it  will  teach  the  lesson  that  when  war 
is  unavoidable,  when  it  is  forced  upon  us  by  other  nations,  or  when  the  life  or 
honor  of  our  country  demands  it,  the  only  way  to  minimize  its  horrors,  to 
bring  it  to  a  swift  and,  for  us,  favorable  conclusion  is  to  be  prepared  for  war. 
We  believe  the  history  of  nations  for  the  past  century  teaches  the  lesson  that 
the  best  deterrent  against  war  is  adequate  preparation  for  war. 

Let  me  again  impress  upon  you  the  fact  that  the  Army  and  the  Navy  do 
not  stand  for  war,  that  they  do  not  want  war,  and  that  they  have  no  voice  in 


24 

bringing  about  war.  War  is  either  forced  upon  us  by  other  nations  or  is 
entered  upon  by  the  will  of  our  own  people.  The  danger  in  the  first  .con 
tingency  can  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  or  wholly  removed  by  adequate  prepar 
ation  for  war  in  time  of  peace.  In  the  second  contingency,  the  best  way  to 
keep  our  own  people  from  being  carried  away  by  an  excess  of  patriotic  fervor, 
and,  in  the  excitement  of  the  moment,  entering  upon  war  lightly,  or  from  enter 
ing  upon  war  at  all  under  any  conditions  except  where  our  national  life  or  honor 
demands  it — is  to  place  before  them,  and  educate  them  in,  a  correct  military 
history  of  our  country,  one  that  will  give  all  the  truth  and  be  absolutely  free 
from  bias  or  prejudice.  Surely  this  is  a  work  that  patriotism  demands  of  us, 
and  one  that  will  do  more  to  bring  continued  peace  to  our  country  than  could 
any  work  heretofore  done  or  proposed  by  our  peace  societies.  We  even  invite 
the  cooperation  of  such  societies,  since  here  is  a  field  wherein  we  all  can  work 
towards  the  attainment  of  the  same  desired  end.  Educate  the  people  in  our 
military  history  and  then  let  them  decide  whether  the  United  States  can  best 
ensure  peace  and  reduce  the  cost  and  the  horrors  of  war  to  a  minimum  by  prep 
aration  for  war  in  time  of  peace  or  by  doing  away  with  armies  and  navies.  We 
of  the  Army  and  Navy  will  confidently  leave  our  case  for  decision  in  the  hands 
of  a  people  who  know  the  military  history  of  their  country. 

THE  CHAIRMAN:  There  is  one  more  regular  speaker,  who  will  next  be  offered. 
I  observe  the  first  vice-president  of  the  American  Historical  Association  here, 
and  I  will  ask  him  to  take  the  chair,  as  I  am  under  bond  to  preside  at  a  meeting 
at  twelve  o'clock.  After  Maior  Shelton's  paper,  there  will  be  a  contribution 
to  this  meeting  by  one  who  speaks  by  authority.  When  Colonel  Roosevelt 
was  Police  Commissioner  in  New  York  he  had  a  habit  of  going  about  to  see 
where  the  men  were,  whether  the  policemen  were  standing  on  post,  and  I 
suppose  he  has  dropped  in  to  the  War  Section  this  morning  to  make  sure  that 
we  are  doing  our  duty.  Will  Professor  Dunning  take  the  chair? 

Professor  William  A.  Dunning  took  the  chair 

PROFESSOR  DUNNING:  The  first  vice-president  fails  to  understand  why, 
when  the  president  is  here,  he  is  called  upon  to  take  the  chair.  Perhaps  it  is 
because  it  is  customary  when  the  superior  is  present  to  have  the  subordinate 
do  the  work 

We  will  now  listen  to  a  paper  by  Major  Shelton  of  the  United  States  Army. 

MAJOR  SHELTON  said : 

Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  not  so  long  ago  an  American 
woman  educator  suggested  that  there  be  a  united  effort  to  destroy  all  the  tin 
soldiers  and  the  toy  cannon  that  are  now  among  the  playthings  of  our  boy 
youth,  on  the  theory  that  these  things  instill  into  the  young  the  military  spirit 
and  the  love  of  war,  and  that  they  provoke  all  the  evil  consequences  qf  mili 
tarism.  Now  it  may  be,  if  war  is  the  mere  illusory  consequence  of  an  un 
healthy  mental  condition  of  a  people,  as  some  profess  to  believe,  that  this 
suggestion  is  not  without  psychological  weight.  But  presuming,  for  the 
moment,  this  view  of  war  correct,  it  still  would  seem  that  there  might  be 
danger  to  us  in  the  literal  administration  of  the  suggested  remedy,  even  if  as 
potent  as  its  advocate  believed.  Wholly  to  destroy  the  military  spirit  and  to 
discourage  all  thought  of  war  in  the  youth  of  this  country  while  the  military 
spirit  is  still  developed  elsewhere  in  the  world,  and  the  idea  of  war,  if  not 
encouraged,  is  at  least  recognized,  might  mean  our  destruction  some  time  in 


25 

the  future  through  inability  to  protect  ourselves  from  aggression.  But  there 
is  another  consideration  more  closely  related  to  our  present  subject.  Suppose, 
also  for  a  moment,  that  war  is  not  an  illusion  due  to  a  perverted  mental  state, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  a  natural  condition  of  man  in  his  present  state  of  develop 
ment.  Would  the  destruction  of  military  toys,  in  which  the  boy  youth  seems 
to  find  much  delight,  serve  then  the  purpose  planned?  Would  the  destruction 
of  all  the  dolls  in  the  world.,  let  me  ask,  kill  the  spirit  of  motherhood  in  the 
future  woman?  Dolls  do  not  provoke  motherhood;  they  respond  to  a  natural 
demand.  What  if  tin  soldiers  are  no  different?  But  these  two  things,  you 
may  say,  are  not  to  be  compared,  and,  saying  this,  you  may,  of  course,  be  right, 
but  also  you  may  be  wrong;  for  I  hold  that  there  is  no  one  yet  that  has  proved 
or  even  attempted  to  prove  that  these  things  do  not  come  from  exactly  the  same 
cause — the  mere  struggle  for  existence.  No  one  pretends  to  deny  continued 
necessity  for  this  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  individual.  The  man  driven  to 
hunger,  no  matter  what  his  moral  training  or  his  moral  strength,  will  even 
commit  crime  to  appease  his  appetite — which  is  one  reason  for  the  continued 
existence  of  police.  Are  we  sure  yet  that  we  can  properly  deny  that  the  same 
instinct  works  in  men  collectively?  Unless  we  be,  there  is  reason  for  the  con 
tinued  existence  of  armies.  Nations  are  men  collectively,  as  well  as  men 
divided.  The  starving  nation  may  struggle,  may  even  commit  international 
crime,  to  avoid  what  seems  worse.  It  is  a  common  argument  of  those  who  hope 
for  the  passing  of  war  that  the  poverty  of  a  nation  must  serve  to  prevent  it 
entering  upon  war.  Those  who  employ  this  argument  are  ignorant  of  history. 
Are  the  Balkan  allies  in  Europe  now  among  the  wealthy  nations  of  the  world? 
Where  in  the  world's  money  markets  could  they  have  borrowed  money  for 
war  six  months  ago?  Can  anybody  believe  that  it  would  not  be  easier  for  them 
to  borrow  money  now  to  continue  war  than  it  would  have  been  to  borrow  but 
a  few  months  ago  to  begin  war?  Was  Japan,  in  1903.  wealthy  as  nations  go? 
Were  the  Boers  nationally  wealthy  when  they  fought  England?  Was  Spain 
wealthy  in  1898?  Was  Prussia  wealthy  in  1866  when  she  could  not  borrow 
money  at  ten  per  cent?  Was  she  wealthy  when  she  faced  France  four  years 
later?  Yet  would  anyone  have  suggested  ten  per  cent  interest  to  Prussia  after 
Metz?  Search  the  past  and  the  same  questions  and  the  same  answers  stare 
out  from  every  corner.  The  world  little  likes  the  oppression  of  the  poor  by 
the  rich — even  though  it  is  slow  to  prevent  oppression.  It  little  likes  aggression 
by  rich  nations.  But  it  applauds  always  successful  resistance  whether  by  the 
individual  or  the  nation.  Is  this  anything  less  than  recognition  of  the  moral 
right,  if  not  the  necessity,  of  both  to  struggle  for  existence? 

Now,  if  I  am  correct  in  my  judgment  that  no  one  has  undertaken  seriously 
to  establish  any  difference  between  tin  soldiers  and  wax  dolls,  it  seems  to  me 
a  very  singular  fact.  For  whatever  may  be  the  purpose  of  the  future,  war  has 
been  a  factor  of  world  development  since  the  beginning  of  recorded  time. 
Not  only  this,  but  it  has  been  by  far  the  most  important  factor.  Most  of  the 
records  of  the  world's  history  are  accounts  of  the  world's  wars. 

It  is  a  common  thing  now  to  decry  war  as  an  unnecessary  evil;  yet  if  war  is 
an  unnecessary  evil  to-day,  it  must  always  have  been  an  unnecessary  evil. 
Probably  those  who  believe  it  both  unnecessary  and  evil  to-day  believe  the 
same  thing  of  it  in  the  past.  But  no  one  has  so  proved  it  nor  attempted  so 
to  prove  it.  No  one,  in  short,  has  studied  war  in  the  abstract  sufficiently  to 
be  able  to  declare  convincingly  whether  or  not  war  as  a  factor  in  world  develop- 


26 

ment  has  meant  on  the  whole  evil  or  good.  I  am  not  here  to  plead  the  cause 
of  war;  but  it  seems  to  me  if  I  am  correct  in  this  that  there  is  a  tempting  field 
still  open  to  the  investigator. 

Not  so  many  years  ago  I  read  with  interest  in  the  public  press  the  report 
that  a  well  known  American  educator  was  to  devote  the  remainder  of  his  life 
to  study  in  this  field.  Judging  by  the  fragmentary  comment  that  has  come 
from  him  through  the  press  since,  the  report  was  wrong.  Judged  in  this  way 
it  would  seem  only  that,  convinced  before  beginning  his  study  that  war  has 
been  an  evil,  he  is  concerned  now  only  with  reiterating  his  conviction.  The 
field  of  research  to  which  I  have  referred  is  never  to  be  covered  by  prejudice 
and  is  never  to  be  covered  at  all  by  anyone  unwilling  to  give,  if  necessary,  the 
entire  working  period  of  his  life  to  research,  criticism,  and  logical  deduction 
before  he  gives  his  conclusions  to  the  world. 

All  this  may  seem  aside  from  the  subject  of  this  conference.  Yet  it  is  not 
aside;  it  is  directly  and  closely  related.  For  it  is  certain  that  we  can  know 
accurately  little  of  what  war  has  meant  in  our  own  national  life  until  we  have 
some  knowledge  of  what  war  has  meant  in  world  development.  And  there  is 
an  even  more  important  connection.  Those  who  decry  war  as  unnecessary 
under  all  circumstances  are  believers  in  peace  under  all  circumstances.  Those 
who  believe  that  the  military  spirit  can  be  killed  by  the  destruction  of  toy 
soldiers  believe  that  peace,  like  war,  is  the  simple  result  of  a  state  of  mind. 
The  patriotic  fervor  which  sweeps  a  whole  people  into  defense  of  its  hearth 
stones  must  then  be  made  impossible.  But  to  do  this  something  more  than 
soldiers  of  tin,  even  soldiers  of  flesh  and  blood,  must  be  got  rid  of.  The  soldiers 
of  history  must  be  forgot.  In  other  words,  if  we  follow  arguments  of  this  kind 
to  their  logical  conclusion,  and  we  may  find  plenty  of  them  to  follow  in  the 
utterance  of  many  earnest  advocates  of  the  cause  of  peace,  is  it  not  clear  that 
they  rest  for  admission  upon  the  denial,  or,  at  least,  upon  the  suppression  of 
the  facts  of  history?  It  is  not  worth  while  to  inquire  now  whether  the  facts 
of  history  can  be  permanently  suppressed,  so  long  as  there  remains  the  possi 
bility  of  their  discovery;  but  it  is  within  our  province,  I  think,  to  ask  whether 
the  advocates  of  any  cause  who  fear  the  truth  can  hope  ever  to  win,  or,  indeed, 
ever  to  do  their  cause  anything  but  harm?  Certainly  those  who  hope  for  the 
day  of  universal  peace  can  do  nothing  more  likely  to  postpone  it  than  to  oppose 
the  accurate  recording  of  the  days  of  war. 

In  our  purpose  now  to  seek  the  means  whereby  an  accurate  record  of  our 
own  war  history  may  be  assured,  it  would  seem  then  that,  first  of  all,  we  should 
have  supporting  us  every  earnest  advocate  of  peace.  I  hope  we  may;  but 
my  experience  so  far  has  given  me  little  ground  for  expectation.  It  is  unfor 
tunate,  but  true,  that  earnestness  and  love  of  peace  do  not  always  betoken^ 
wisdom.  Outside  of  this  class,  which  ought  to  be  wholly  with  us,  but  which 
will  in  fact  be  divided,  and  possibly  quite  largely  in  opposition,  there  are,  so- 
far  as  I  can  see,  but  two  classes  of  our  people  likely  to  take  active  interest 
in  our  present  endeavor.  The  first  of  these  is  composed  of  historians,  his 
torical  students,  and  those  interested  in  one  way  or  another  in  historical  research. 
I  take  it  that  this  class  is  finely  represented  by  the  Association  under  whose 
auspices  this  conference  is  assembled.  But  the  interest  of  this  class,  speaking 
generally,  is  indirect,  lying  as  it  must  simply  in  the  broad  purpose  of  attaining 
historical  truth  and  avoiding  permanent  record  of  historical  error.  But  this 
purpose  alone  should  be  sufficient  to  induce  both  sympathy  and  assistance;: 


2? 

and  before  we  go  far  I  think  it  will  be  found  that  both  are  needed.  The  other 
and  last  class  is  the  military  services  of  our  country  and  those  interested  with 
them  in  developing  an  efficient  military  system.  Please  mark  that  I  do  not 
say  an  efficient  army  and  navy,  but  an  efficient  military  system,  a  thing  that 
this  country  has  never  had,  but  which,  good  or  bad,  with  us  must  include 
much  more  than  the  few  active  forces  ordinarily  maintained. 

Yet  this  system  has  a  history  antedating  the  history  of  the  nation,  a  history 
worked  out  at  much  cost  in  American  lives  and  dollars,  which  no  one  yet  has 
had  the  courage  or  the  knowledge  accurately  to  record.  And  the  history  of 
this  system  is  the  military  history  of  this  country.  Where  in  war  lives  have 
been  unnecessarily  expended  or  dollars  wasted  in  military  extravagance  it 
has  been  due  to  its  faults.  Where  there  has  been  real  success  in  war  it  has  been 
due  to  its  virtues.  But  the  trouble  is  that  few  of  us  realize  all  the  waste  and 
extravagance,  and  fewer  still  probably  where  our  real  successes  have  lain,  or 
how  much  counted  as  success  has  in  truth  been  failure.  And  we  never  shall 
know  these  things  until  we  have  an  accurate  record  of  our  military  history ; 
and  we  never  shall  be  able  to  create  an  efficient  military  system  until  this 
record  has  not  merely  been  made  available  but  has  been  studied  and  our  mili 
tary  system  established  in  accordance  with  the  principles  deduced  therefrom. 

Count  me  wholly  selfish  then,  if  need  be,  in  confessing  a  greater  interest 
now  in  the  development  of  an  efficient  military  system  than  in  pure  historical 
truths.  Yet  while  counting  me  thus  and  making  due  allowance  for  corre 
sponding  prejudices,  admit  also,  as  I  think  you  must,  that  the  record  of  his 
torical  truths  is  not  an  end  of  itself,  but  a  means  to  judgment  of,  and  better 
preparation  for,  the  future.  Admitting  this,  I  think  we  shall  find  ourselves 
not  far  apart. 

From  this  you  may  judge  that  it  is  less  a  question  with  me  concerning  who 
shall  write  our  military  history  than  whether  our  military  history  shall  be 
written.  It  may  be  said  truthfully  enough  that  the  military  history  of  the 
world  has  never  been  written — accurately — and  this,  notwithstanding  that 
perhaps  nine  lines  out  of  every  ten  recounting  what  purports  to  be  the  history  of 
the  old  world  are  concerned  with  the  deeds  of  war.  It  would  be  no  less  our  duty 
to  recount  our  own  history  accurately,  if  possible,  were  there  nothing  preceding 
it.  Our  national  history,  as  history  goes,  covers  a  brief  period  of  world  time, 
but  a  period  during  which  the  arts  familiar  to  us  had  early  reached  a  stage 
where  accurate  account  of  all  that  has  occurred  ought  to  be  the  easiest  of  all 
records  in  the  world  to  put  in  form.  And  yet  I  doubt,  if  the  commonly  accepted 
beliefs  of  much  of  our  national  history  be  taken  as  a  criterion,  whether  our 
history  is  any  more  accurately  recorded  than  the  history  of  ancient  Greece 
and  Rome.  There  can  be  but  one  reason  for  this.  And  this  reason  lies  in 
the  failure  accurately  to  record,  not  our  deeds  in  peace,  but  our  deeds  in  war; 
since,  notwithstanding  the  comparative  brevity  of  our  national  life  and  the 
longer  periods  of  peace  intervening  between  wars,  still  war  in  its  inception, 
its  progress,  and  its  results  has  made  up  by  far  the  larger  part  of  our  history, 
as  it  has  of  every  other  history  in  the  world. 

The  question,  indeed,  is  not  who  shall  write  our  military  history  but  who  can 
write  it.  So  far,  speaking  generally,  it  has  been  written  by  the  civilian.  It 
is  no  criticism  of  the  many  fine  accounts  of  detached  military  events  that  are 
a  part  of  our  literature  to  say  that  the  civilian  has  failed  in  his  task,  if,  indeed, 
he  ever  consciously  undertook  it.  These  accounts  are  of  undoubted  value. 


28 

but  they  are  of  value  not  as  military  history  but  as  sources  of  military  history. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  urged  that  since  practically  all  that  has  been 
produced  in  the  way  of  military  history  has  been  written  by  civilians,  it  follows 
that  the  military  man  can  produce  nothing,  or,  at  least,  nothing  better.  But 
this  conclusion  does  not  in  fact  follow.  There  has  been  so  far  no  means  by 
which  our  military  history  could  be  produced  by  men  of  military  training.  It 
is  to  find  this  means  that  we  are  seeking  your  assistance  now. 

Again,  it  may  be  said  that  in  the  brief  text-books  of  history  which  are  all 
that  the  student  in  general  can  be  expected  to  peruse,  it  is  impossible  to  record 
more  than  the  bare  facts,  and  since  the  details  must  be  omitted,  it  matters 
not  whether  the  writer  has  technical  knowledge  of  the  military  art  or  not. 
This  is  true  provided  that  there  be  available  stores  of  exact  information  and 
reasoned  deductions  from  which  the  historical  writer  untrained  in  the  military 
art  can  draw  the  facts  to  be  recorded  in  histories  of  this  kind.  But  where  are 
those  stores  now?  They  do  not  exist.  And  the  point  I  would  like  to  make  is 
that  they  cannot  be  brought  into  existence  until  some  one  not  merely  trained 
in  modern  historical  methods,  but  acquainted  with  the  technicalities  of  the 
military  art,  has  given  the  best  there  is  in  him  to  their  production.  In  other 
words,  our  military  history,  if  it  is  ever  to  be  correctly  written,  either  for  the 
military  or  the  civilian  student,  must  be  first  prepared  by  the  militarily  trained 
historian  alone,  or  by  the  militarily  trained  historian  in  collaboration  with  the 
untrained  civilian. 

Germany  and  France  have,  speaking  in  a  large  sense,  recorded  their  military 
histories  through  the  agency  of  a  section  of  their  general  staffs.  It  is  true 
that  these  histories  have  not  escaped  criticism.  No  history  does,  and  probably 
no  history  should  escape  criticism.  The  best  history  is  but  an  approximation 
of  the  truth.  But  it  is  also  true  that  the  general  staff  histories  of  Germany 
and  France  have  not  escaped  the  serious  criticism  of  suppression  of  facts  and 
false  deduction.  Moreover,  this  criticism  is  undoubtedly  just  and  it  is  all  the 
more  serious,  since  the  suppression  and  false  deduction  were  undoubtedly  pur 
posely  made.  There  should  be  nothing  but  condemnation  for  this  course, 
which,  through  its  very  failure  to  accomplish  its  purpose,  has  condemned 
itself.  But  the  "official"  histories  need  not  be  wholly  outlawed  on  this  account. 
Historical  error  purposely  made  may  be  worse  morally  than  unintentional 
error,  but  the  difference  in  results  may  favor  the  intended  error,  since  it  is 
almost  certain  to  be  discovered  and  disclosed.  Furthermore,  the  incentive 
to  greater  accuracy  in  unofficial  histories,  as  well  as  the  new  sources  of  infor 
mation  afforded  through  the  official  accounts,  is  not  to  be  neglected.  But  there 
is  another  object  to  be  attained.  War  everywhere,  of  course,  is  conducted 
on  much  the  same  lines.  It  is  the  oldest  of  man's  games.  It  is  played  by 
teams  trained  in  much  the  same  way.  The  rules  are  the  same  the  world  over. 
Yet  no  nation  can  blindly  copy  the  methods  of  another  in  war  and  hope  for 
success.  War  brings  out  the  deepest  there  is  in  us,  in  the  individual  and  in 
the  nation.  If  there  is  anything  of  national  unity,  national  thought,  or 
national  spirit,  it  appears  in  war.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  military  nations 
turn  their  attention  to  discovering  what  this  national  thing  is  that  brings  them 
victory  and  prevents  defeat,  and  discovering  this  they  write  its  principles  into  a 
doctrine  which  they  endeavor  to  instill  into  the  hearts  and  minds  of  their  armies, 
and  with  which,  so  far  as  possible,  to  inspire  the  whole  body  politic.  But  it 
is  even  more  important  with  us,  without  an  army  in  any  large  sense  and 


29 

dependent  upon  the  creation  of  armies  after  war  is  upon  us,  to  learn  what  it 
is  that  has  actuated  the  conduct  of  our  troops  and  our  people  in  the  past, 
and  to  put  the  principles  of  this  conduct  into  a  consistent  theory  that  may 
become  an  American  doctrine  of  war.  But  this  is  only  to  be  discovered 
through  close  study  of  our  history  and  only  to  be  formulated  by  men  militarily 
trained. 

Since  generally  where  a  nation's  military  history  has  been  recorded  and  a 
doctine  of  war  formulated,  it  has  been  the  work  of  its  general  staff,  it  at  least 
seems  likely  that  if  our  military  history  is  ever  to  be  recorded  and  a  consistent 
theory  of  war  evolved,  it  must  be  done  by  the  same  agency.  This  in  no  sense 
denies  the  vast  aid  that  civilian  individuals  or  associations  may  render  in  this 
work;  but  it  does  deny  that  civilians,  untrained  militarily,  either  alone  or  com 
bined,  can  ever  write  our  military  history  in  a  manner  conducive  to  the  greatest 
good.  The  foundation  of  a  general  staff  properly  constituted  is  its  historical 
section.  It  may  well  be  said,  then,  that  our  general  staff  is  not  properly  con 
stituted  inasmuch  as  it  has  within  its  organization  as  yet  no  such  section.  And 
very  promptly  I  shall  admit  this  truth.  Our  general  staff  has  been  in  existence 
now  for  nearly  a  dozen  years.  It  has  never  yet  met  the  expectations  its  friends 
built  upon  its  organization,  and  it  may  not  meet  them  for  long  years  to  come. 
It  has  rarely  been  understood  by  the  public,  the  press,  or  the  politicians.  It 
has  been  freely  criticized  and  undoubtedly  it  has  made  some  enemies.  As  an 
organization  it  is  still  imperfect.  But  the  general  staff  has  had  many  difficul 
ties  to  contend  against.  It  has  had  indeed  unfortunately  to  struggle  throughout 
largety  for  its  own  existence.  Yet,  notwithstanding  the  ignorance,  bigotry, 
and  selfishness  against  which  it  has  contended,  notwithstanding  the  imper 
fection  of  its  organization,  it  still  represents  in  its  creation  the  greatest  step 
forward  ever  taken  in  our  military  development,  and  its  accomplishments 
even  in  the  brief  period  of  its  existence  mean  more  for  development  and  effi 
ciency  in  the  future  than  all  the  military  legislation  that  was  put  upon  the 
statute  books  during  the  whole  of  our  preceding  national  existence.  Not 
withstanding  its  enemies  and  its  unpopularity  in  quarters  where  it  should 
receive  support,  I  have  full  faith  in  its  capacity  to  work  its  way  and  our  way 
out  of  the  difficulties  confronting  us.  Nevertheless,  I  confess  freely  to  dis 
appointment  over  its  failure  to  establish  some  soi  t  of  an  historical  section  at 
the  outset  and  to  still  deeper  disappointment  over  its  continued  failure  to 
establish  such  a  section  thereafter.  For  I  do  not  believe  until  such  a  section  is 
a  part  of  the  general  staff,  until,  indeed,  it  is  its  very  foundation,  that  this  body 
can  fulfil  in  any  reasonable  measure  the  functions  properly  pertaining  to  it. 
It  is  of  course  true  that  as  now  organized,  such  a  section,  even  if  established, 
could  not  hope  to  attain  real  success.  This  is  not  merely  because  the  general 
staff  is  not  large  enough  to  meet  the  present  demands  upon  it,  not  even  because 
during  the  last  session  of  Congress  it  was  unfortunately  reduced  in  number. 
The  writing  of  our  military  history  is  its  most  important  work,  and  if  to  do  it 
other  important  work  must  be  neglected,  it  should  still  not  hesitate.  Had 
the  general  staff  but  two  men  within  its  organization,  I  believe  that  one  of  them 
should  be  constituted  into  an  historical  section.  The  real  difficulty  lies  deeper. 
The  general  staff  as  now  organized  is  composed  of  officers  detailed  for  tours  of 
four  years  therewith.  Frequently  in  practise  these  periods  are  much  shorter. 
It  would  be  impossible  to  attempt  seriously  the  research  and  criticism  and  study 
essential  to  completing  any  part  of  our  military  history  by  a  continually 


30 

changing  group  of  men  such  as  this.  In  other  words,  the  establishment  of 
a  section  of  the  general  staff  likely  fully  to  meet  our  needs  in  this  respect  is 
dependent  upon  legislation  that  will  give  to  this  part  greater  freedom  in  the 
selection  of  its  members  and  indefinite  tenure  of  office  to  those  assigned  to  it. 
I  believe,  personally,  that  legislation  should  go  much  further  and  should  give 
to  this  section  of  the  general  staff  authority  to  add  civilian  historians  to  its 
working  membership,  to  collaborate  with  civilian  writers  in  the  work  of  pro 
duction,  and  to  purchase  the  product,  when  desirable,  of  civilian  workers  in 
the  same  field.  The  qualities  required  by  the  writer  of  military  history,  as 
has  been  well  shown  here,  are  such  as  are  rarely  wholly  given  either  to  the  soldier 
or  to  the  civilian.  Nevertheless  there  are  civilians  capable  of  acquiring  much 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  technicalities  of  the  military  art,  just  as  there  are 
soldiers  capable  of  acquiring  considerable  erudition  and  some  of  trie  literary 
graces.  Moreover,  it  happens  not  infrequently  in  military  life  that  officers 
acquiring  much  technical  knowledge  in  their  younger  days  are  forced  through 
physical  infirmities  from  the  active  pursuit  of  their  profession.  Qualities  of 
mind  are  not  always  lost  through  the  physical  infirmities  that  prevent  active 
service,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that,  given  the  authority,  the  general  staff 
could  develop  a  section  composed  of  active  officers  when  fitted  for  this  work, 
of  retired  officers  who  could  develop  at  least  some  of  the  required  qualities, 
and  of  civilian  collaborators  and  co-workers,  which  section  I  think  would  come 
in  time  to  meet  every  necessity  of  the  case. 

Moreover,  the  general  staff  would  have  certain  advantages  which  civilians, 
alone  or  in  combination,  could  not  hope  to  secure.  It  would  have  not  only 
the  libraries  of  the  War  Department  and  the  War  College,  probably  the  best 
technical  collections  available  in  this  country,  the  technical  studies  of  the  War 
College  classes,  and  the  means  for  more  readily  performing  the  cartographic 
work  and  the  press  work,  but  it  would  have  also  the  great  advantage  of  im 
mediate  access  to  the  archives  of  the  War  Department,  which  hold  all  there  is 
of  the  official  records  of  our  military  history. 

It  seems  to  me,  then,  that  on  all  accounts  our  start  in  the  right  direction 
lies  through  the  general  staff.  Shall  we  not  then  frankly  face  the  conditions 
as  they  are  and  do  what  we  can,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  to  the  general  staff, 
laid  in  ignorance,  to  make  a  start  in  this  field  in  the  right  direction?  I  believe 
that  the  encouragement  of  this  Association  can  do  much  to  help  us  now  in  a 
time  of  serious  need,  that  it  can  do  much  in  the  cause  of  national  historical 
truth,  much  toward  the  creation  of  a  sound  military  system,  and  much  in  the 
cause  of  peace,  and  believing  this,  so  far  as  I  can  speak  for  the  department 
I  informally  represent,  I  commit  our  case  very  gladly  into  your  hands. 

PROFESSOR  DUNNING:  The  subject  of  this  conference  must  appeal  very 
strongly  to  one  who  is  president  of  the  American  Historical  Association  and 
who  has  been  commander  in  chief  of  the  American  Army.  Will  Colonel 
Roosevelt  address  the  conference? 

COLONEL  ROOSEVELT  said: 

When  Professor  Johnston  and  Major  Shelton  asked  me  to  come  to  this 
session  I  hesitated  because  I  do  not  know  that  you  are  willing  to  hear  just  the 
things  that  I  think  you  ought  to  hear  in  connection  with  our  military  history 
and  the  lessons  to  be  learned  from  our  military  history.  In  essence,  I  have 
only  to  say  "ditto"  to  the  two  gentlemen  whose  papers  I  have  heard  read 


since  entering  this  room.  But  there  are  two  or  three  things  referred  to  by 
them  on  which  I  would  like  to  lay .  additional  emphasis.  I  don't  believe 
it  is  possible  to  treat  military  history  as  something  entirely  apart  from  the 
general  national  history.  I  will  go  a  little  further  than  that:  I  think  it  is 
utterly  idle  to  try  to  understand  the  German  victories  in  1866  and  1870  unless 
you  study  the  German  history  from  the  time  when  Stein  and  Scharnhorst 
began  the  reforms  until  those  reforms  reached  their  culmination  under  Ruhl 
and  Moltke.  I  don't  think  that  any  study  of  the  last  sixty  days'  military 
operations  in  the  Balkans  would  help  you  to  understand  what  was  done  if  you 
didn't  study  carefully  the  history  of  the  Balkan  people  for  at  least  a  generation 
previous  to  this  war  that  we  have  seen  going  on  before  our  eyes.  I  am  per 
fectly  clear  that  the  military  history  must  be  written  primarily — not  entirely, 
but  primarily — by  military  men,  and  for  that  reason  I  have  felt  that  it  should 
be  written  under  the  observation  of  the  general  staff,  but  I  feel  that  there 
should  be  the  collaboration  of  civilians  with  the  military  writers,  and  if  those 
civilian  writers  are  of  the  proper  type  some  of  the  most  important  lessons  will 
be  taught  by  them,  and  they  will  be  among  the  most  important  lessons  because 
they  will  be  lessons  that  the  military  man  can't  with  propriety  teach.  They 
will  be  criticisms  of  the  American  government  and  the  American  people.  I 
don't  wish  to  see  the  military  history  written  by  the  general  staff  alone,  because 
the  general  staff  can't  with  propriety  tell  the  whole  truth  about  the  government 
and  about  the  people  to  the  government  and  to  the  people.  For  instance, 
any  history  of  the  Spanish  war  to  be  of  the  slightest  value  to  our  people  in 
the  future  would  have  to  deal  for  two-thirds  at  least  with  the  utter  lack  of 
preparation  of  the  American  nation  before  it  went  into  that  war,  and  it  would 
have  to  deal  not  with  the  faults  of  the  Army  but  with  the  faults  of  a  civilian 
administration  of  a  previous  generation  and  deal  with  those  faults  as  committed 
not  by  wicked  people  in  office  on  their  own  initiative,  but  because  the  American 
people  hadn't  waked  up  to  the  need  of  preparation,  to  the  need  of  having  what 
ever  forces  they  did  have  efficient. 

Infinitely  more  than  a  mere  military  question,  a  question  of  strategy  or 
tactics,  is  involved  in  the  proper  military  history  of  the  United  States.  The 
attitude  of  the  people  must  be  corrected.  If  the  Bulgarians  had  for  twenty- 
five  years  been  taught  that  questions  of  national  honor  and  vital  interest 
could  be  arbitrated  and  had  believed  such  teachings,  you  couldn't  have  called 
a  Bulgarian  army  together  that  could  have  fought — you  couldn't  have  made 
them  fight.  If  you  teach  a  soldier  that  he  can  arbitrate  a  slap  in  the  face, 
you  have  got  a  soldier  that  you  can't  trust  to  fight;  and  if  you  teach  a  nation 
so  that  it  really  believes  it  can  arbitrate  a  question  of  national  honor  or  vital 
interest  you  have  got  a  nation  that  won't  fight.  And  there  is  another  side: 
If  you  teach  a  nation  that  it  can  promise  to  arbitrate  and  break  its  promise, 
you  are  reaching  it  a  bad  lesson.  If  you  teach  a  nation  that  to  please  ten  or 
fifteen  per  cent  of  its  people  it  can  agree  to  arbitrate,  make  a  promise  to  arbi 
trate  a  matter,  with  the  certain ty  that  it  will  repudiate  that  promise  the  instant 
that  fifteen  or  twenty  per  cent  of  the  people  wish  it  repudiated,  you  have 
entered  upon  a  bad  career  from  the  national  standpoint.  And  you  can't 
act  that  way,  you  can't  distort  the  national  spirit,  weaken  the  national  sense 
of  honor,  without  reacting  to  some  degree  upon  its  army. 

A  proper  history  of  the  Army  must  in  part  be  written  by  the  right  type  of 
civilian,  because  it  must  deal  with  our  national  shortcomings,  not  only  govern- 


32 

mental,  but  popular,  and  point  out  truthfully  what  those  national  shortcom 
ings  have  cost  us  in  the  past  when  war  came  upon  us.  I  very  seriously  doubt 
if  there  is  any  man  in  this  country  more  genuinely  an  advocate  of  peace  than 
I  am;  because  if  there  was  a  war  either  I  would  go  to  it  or  my  sons  would  go 
to  it — that  is,  a  serious  war,  not  one  of  our  police  businesses — and  I  don't  want 
to  go  to  war,  and  I  don't  want  my  sons  to  go;  so  I  have  every  personal  interest 
in  making  as  strong  a  plea  for  peace  as  any  man  can.  But  I  know  my  fellow 
countrymen,  and  I  know  that  no  matter  what  general  resolutions  they  came 
to  in  advance,  no  matter  what  the  lack  of  preparations,  they  would  go  to  war 
on  the  drop  of  a  hat  if  ever  the  national  honor  or  the  national  interest  was 
seriously  jeopardized. 

The  way  to  prevent  the  possibility  therefore  is  to  keep  ourselves,  our  whole 
military  system,  the  Army  and  Navy  as  part  of  the  whole  military  system, 
in  such  a  condition  that  there  won't  be  any  temptation  on  the  part  of  anyone 
else  to  go  to  war  with  us.  You  can't  do  that  unless  you  make  our  people  wake 
up  to  the  real  meaning  of  our  past  history.  The  immediate  past  I  suppose 
can  hardly  be  written  of  sufficiently  dispassionately,  because  to  write  it  truth 
fully  you  would  have  to  give  great  offense  to  so  many  good  people,  who  simply 
happened  unfortunately  to  be  in  positions  where  anyone  would  have  done 
badly  under  the  existing  conditions,  and  who  therefore  did  badly;  and  it 
would  be  hard  upon  them  to  hold  them  up  to  scorn  or  obloquy  for  what  really 
wasn't  their  fault.  In  consequence  it  would  be  a  very  difficult  thing  to  teach 
the  lessons  of  history  from  what  has  occurred  while  the  men  who  did  the  deeds 
are  still  living. 

I  shan't  speak  of  the  Civil  War,  but  I  shall  speak  of  that  little  war,  the 
Spanish  war,  in  which  I  was.  I  was  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy  at  the 
outbreak  of  that  war;  it  was  part  of  my  duty  to  help  in  making  preparations 
during  the  three  months  intervening  between  the  blowing  up  of  the  Maine 
and  the  actual  going  to  war.  My  experiences  would  have  been  comic  if  they 
hadn't  been  fraught  with  such  tragedy.  If  I  should  ever  write  a  history  of 
that  war  I  would  have  to  write  very  harshly  of  many  high  officers  of  the  Army 
and  the  Navy,  especially  the  Army,  gentlemen.  The  defects,  for  very  obvious 
reasons,  were  much  greater  among  the  higher  officers  of  the  Army  than  among 
the  higher  officers  of  the  Navy,  and  I  should  have  to  write  with  great  harshness 
of  the  governmental  system  that  had  permitted  those  faults  to  grow  up.  It 
wasn't  the  fault  of  the  officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy;  it  was  the  fault  of  our 
system  of  the  preceding  thirty  years.  And  I  wish  I  could  convey  to  you 
vividly  an  idea  of  the  panic  that  prevailed  along  sections  of  the  Atlantic  coast. 
You  ought  to  recollect  it,  some  of  you,  yourselves.  I  don't  know  whether 
you  do  or  not,  but  the  panic  that  prevailed  along  sections  of  the  Atlantic 
coast  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with  Spain  was  very  real.  ,  There 
was  immense  pressure,  for  instance,  through  Congress,  through  representatives 
responding  to  the  people  behind  them,  to  take  the  Navy  and  distribute  it  on 
the  fine  strategic  plan  of  anchoring  one  vessel  off  each  port  down  the  seacoast, 
so  as  to  insure  even  the  Spanish  picking  it  up  in  detail. 

I  don't  want  to  give  names,  but  I  had  these  two  or  three  experiences :  Two 
very  prominent  members  of  Congress,  one  of  the  two  or  three  leading  members 
of  the  Lower  House  and  one  of  the  two  or  three  leading  members  of  the  Senate, 
after  having  sufficiently  bedevilled  President  McKinley,  were  shunted  by  him 
off  on  me  with  instructions  to  gratify  them  if  I  possibly  could.  They  demanded 
a  vessel  to  protect  the  harbor  of  the  city  in  which  they  both  lived.  They  were 


33 

both  very  important  members  of  the  Congress  and  it  was  very  difficult  to  do 
anything  without  their  aid.  I  was  told  by  the  President  to  try  to  get  them  a 
vessel;  their  city  demanded  it.  I  got  them  a  vessel;  it  was  a  Civil  War  monitor; 
it  was  armed  with  one  smooth-bore  gun  about  as  effective  as  a  culverin ;  it  was 
manned  by  twenty-one  naval  militia,  and  it  was  towed  by  a  tug.  I  sent  it 
out  there  to  that  port  and  it  completely  satisfied  them,  completely  satisfied 
those  two  statesmen,  and  that  city.  It  was  quite  unfit  to  deal  with  any  foe 
of  modern  times,  although  it  might  possibly  have  dealt  with  the  Spanish 
Armada,  though  I  am  not  sure.  It  was  preposterous  as  an  instrument  of 
defense  against  any  modern  opponent,  but  it  met  the  moral  needs  of  the 
situation. 

I  had  one  request  to  send  a  monitor  down  to  anchor  off  Jekyl  Island.  Now 
that  seems  an  absurdity,  but  I  was  pressed  to  do  it.  I  had  quite  an  influential 
lady,  the  wife  of  an  influential  man,  spend  about  half  an  hour  of  my  time  one 
day  in  beseeching  me  for  a  warship  of  some  kind  to  be  anchored  in  the  neighbor 
hood  of  the  big  summer  hotel  where  she  and  her  friends  lived. 

Now  I  am  giving  you  actual  experiences.  You  people  who  live  here  in 
Boston  will  remember  that  a  great  many  of  your  business  men  sent  their 
securities  up  to  the  safe  deposits  in  Worcester,  and  there  was  even  a  proposal 
not  to  allow  the  national  guard  of  Massachusetts  to  go  outside  of  Massachusetts 
so  that  it  should  be  ready  to  protect  Massachusetts  from  the  imminent  Spanish 
invasion.  All  those  things  happened  right  before  our  eyes.  New  York 
Harbor  was  strewn  with  torpedoes  enough  to  have  impeded  all  traffic,  but  for 
the  fact  that  they  wouldn't  go  off.  So  that  we  were  freed  from  that  danger. 

In  dealing  with  the  Army  and  the  Navy  at  that  time  I  found  that  the  Navy 
had  this  very  great  advantage  over  the  Army — the  higher  officers  of  the  Navy 
had  been  obliged  to  practise  eighty  per  cent  of  their  profession  as  it  would  have 
been  practised  in  time  of  war.  A  battleship  going  to  sea  is  taken  under  service 
conditions  necessarily.  There  wasn't  a  colonel  in  our  Army  who  had  a  regi 
ment  which  he  took  into  the  field  under  service  conditions.  A  squadron 
of  battleships  at  sea  is  necessarily  maneuvered  under  service  conditions,  nearly 
ninety  per  cent  of  service  conditions — there  wasn't  the  actual  firing  at  that 
time  that  there  is  now,  but  almost  ninety  per  cent  of  service  conditions.  But 
there  was  not  a  brigade  commander,  let  alone  a  division  commander,  in  our 
Army  who  had  seen  a  brigade  or  taken  part  in  marching  a  brigade  under 
service  conditions  since  the  Civil  War.  The  men  who  were  with  our  army  in 
Santiago,  the  generals,  the  corps  commanders,  the  division  commanders,  the 
brigade  commanders,  were  men  who  had  been  gallant  second  lieutenants  thirty 
odd  years  before  in  the  Civil  War,  while  for  a  few  years  afterwards  a  certain 
number  of  them  had  had  experience  in  Indian  fighting,  but  who  for  over  a 
quarter  of  a  century  had  served  in  posts  where  there  was  one  company  or  half 
a  company  and  where  the  all-absorbing  military  question  was  the  fight  between 
the  captain  and  the  quartermaster  as  to  how  high  to  shave  a  mule's  tail. 

Now,  you  gentlemen  of  the  Army,  from  your  experience,  can  corroborate 
what  I  am  saying.  That  was  the  training  which  the  higher  officers  of  the  little 
American  Army  had  had. 

Of  the  summer  when  we  ambled  down  to  attack  Santiago,  do  you  remember 
what  Mr.  Dooley  said?  Mr.  Dooley  is  a  profound  philosopher.  He  said  that 
in  the  Spanish  war  we  were  in  a  dream  but  the  Spaniards  were  in  a  trance. 
Now  we  can't  always  count  upon  our  foes  being  in  a  trance. 

In  getting  my  regiment  equipped  I  was  very,  very  much  helped  by  Secretary 


34 

Alger — I  shall  always  remember  the  way  he  helped  me  by  cutting  the  red 
tape  that  had  to  be  cut.  There  were  certain  bureau  officials  there  also  who 
helped  me  materially;  for  instance,  Jack  Weston — Jack  Weston  did  everything 
he  could  to  help  us.  But  most  of  those  worthy,  high-minded  heads  of  bureaus 
in  the  War  Department  were  old  gentlemen  who  were  wholly  unable  to  under 
stand  what  modern  warfare  conditions  meant.  For  instance,  I  had  to  make 
a  fight  on  this  point:  I  was  equipping  my  regiment,  and  it  was  near  the  time 
of  the  July  issue  of  clothing.  In  July  they  issued  the  clothing  for  the  following 
winter.  Well,  I  had  to  fight  all  I  knew  how  to  prevent  them  issuing  the  winter 
clothing  for  a  tropic  campaign  in  midsummer.  Now,  you  gentlemen  of  the 
Army  know  that  that  is  the  kind  of  thing  you  are  up  against  when  you  are 
dealing  with  the  perfectly  nice,  high-minded  bureau  man. 

I  was  bound  to  get  brigaded  with  regulars.  We  were  bound  to  get  the 
Krag-Jorgensen,  smokeless  powder  rifles.  The  head  of  a  department,  a  fine 
old  boy,  did  his  best  to  get  me  to  take  black  powder.  He  said  the  other  was 
an  experiment  and,  after  all,  black  powder  would  hide  us  from  the  enemy. 

One  particular  bureau  chief  I  had  this  experience  with :  I  had  made  a  demand 
upon  him  and  he  pointed  out  to  me  the  regulations  and  why  I  couldn't  have, 
for  instance,  horses  or  wagons.  They  had  to  advertise  thirty  days  for  their 
horses — in  which  case  we  would  have  gone  on  foot — and  they  had  to  have  the 
wagons  built,  and  that  would  have  taken  three  to  four  months,  and  so  forth 
and  so  on.  In  a  case  like  that  I  would  go  down  and  get  Alger  to  override 
it  and  come  back.  Well,  for  about  the  fourth  time  he  looked  at  the  requisition 
I  presented  and  said,  "All  right,  you  can  have  it,  you  can  have  it,"  and  he 
sank  back  into  a  chair  and  added:  "Oh,  dear!  I  had  this  bureau  running 
in  such  good  shape  and  along  came  a  war!"  He  treated  the  war  as  an  illegiti 
mate  interruption  to  the  activities  of  the  War  Department.  It  was  most 
natural  that  he  should  have  done  so,  for  the  only  way  that  a  secretary  of  war 
for  the  preceding  thirty  years  could  make  a  reputation  was  by  economies; 
and  the  only  way  he  could  economize  without  breeding  hostility  locally  was  to 
economize  as  regards  the  efficiency  of  the  Army  under  service  conditions  in  the 
future,  and  that  was  the  way  he  did  it. 

In  consequence,  when  the  Army  went  down  to  Santiago — I  am  speaking 
generally — the  Army  itself  had  excellent  material  in  the  ranks,  notably  among 
the  non-commissioned  officers;  about  fifty  per  cent  were  recruits,  but  the 
others  carried  them  along;  the  non-commissioned  officers  were  excellent;  the 
junior  officers  of  the  line  were  excellent — there  were  exceptions  in  both  cases, 
of  course;  but  when  you  got  above  the  rank  of  captain,  even  in  the  line,  they 
were  generally  markedly  inferior  in  their  profession  to  the  corresponding  men 
of  the  Navy,  not  because  they  were  not  the  same  men,  since  they  were  the 
same  men,  but  because  they  had  been  for  thirty  years  deprived  of  every  chance 
of  practising  their  profession.  Thirty  years !  You  take  any  railroad  president 
of  to-day  and  omit  the  thirty  years  just  before  he  became  president  and  leave 
him  only  the  practical  training  of  the  few  years  before  that  when  he  was  a 
$1,600  clerk  at  the  outside,  and  how  much  of  a  railroad  president  would  he 
make?  He  couldn't  do  anything.  That  is  what  happened  in  our  Army. 

Now  I  don't  suppose  that  you  can  get  the  full  and  accurate  history  written 
of  an  event  so  close  as  the  Spanish  war.  If  you  tried  to  do  it,  I  doubt  very 
much  if  you  would  produce  the  right  effect,  because  there  would  be  the  able 
and  industrious  and  persistent  effort  to  misrepresent  what  was  written,  and 
the  effect  upon  the  people  might  be  the  direct  reverse  of  the  effect  you  want 


35 

to  produce.  But  we  can  write  about,  say,  the  war  of  1812 ;  that  is  far  enough 
away  to  permit  us  to  write  about  it  truthfully.  You  can  get  a  full  statement 
of  just  what  we  did  in  that  war.  Such  a  statement  ought  to  show  the  very 
extraordinary  feats  of  valor  and  tactical  efficiency  of  the  small  units  among 
the  regular  forces,  among  the  frigates  and  sloops,  and  we  have  every  reason 
to  be  very  proud  of  what  they  did.  They  did  what  no  navy  of  any  European 
power  in  the  preceding  twenty-five  years  had  been  able  to  do,  that  is,  more  than 
hold  their  own  with  the  English  frigates  and  sloops.  We  captured  a  greater 
number  of  ships  in  single  fight  from  the  English  than  all  the  nations  of  Europe 
Combined  had  captured  from  them  in  single  fight  for  the  preceding  twenty-five 
years;  a  fine  thing,  an  excellent  thing!  On  the  Niagara  frontier,  after  two 
years  of  humiliations,  it  was  utterly  preposterous  the  way  we  developed  the 
Regular  Army,  which  under  Scott  and  old  Jacob  Brown  did  what  the  best 
troops  of  France  had  been  unable  to  do  under  their  best  marshals,  that  is, 
meet  on  equal  terms  the  British  regulars  in  the  open.  At  the  battle  of  the 
Thames  there  was  one  very  noteworthy  incident,  the  charge  of  the  mounted 
riflemen  under  Johnson,  and  their  use  then  as  dismounted  riflemen  in  a  way 
that  was  not  done  in  any  European  war  at  that  time,  and  which  prefigured 
what  was  actually  done  in  the  Civil  War.  And  it  was  a  very  great  triumph 
of  Andrew  Jackson  and  his  volunteers  at  New  Orleans,  a  very  great  triumph. 
Now,  all  of  those  things  should  be  shown.  It  should  also  be  shown  that  we, 
a  nation  of  some  seven  million  people  at  that  time,  proved  unable  to  get  into 
the  field  an  army  competent  to  do  any  serious  offensive  work.  It  should  be 
shown  that  our  failure  to  get  ourselves  any  kind  of  an  adequate  navy  resulted 
in  such  widespread  pressure  upon  our  Congress  as  to  produce  a  strong  secession 
movement  in  the  northeast,  pressure  that  resulted  in  a  very  small  English 
force  keeping  the  whole  Atlantic  seaboard  in  a  condition  of  panic  and  landing 
and  destroying  the  national  capitol  after  the  resistance  at  Bladensburg,  which 
it  seems  almost  incredible  to  read  of  and  to  think  that  the  men  who  ran  at 
Bladensburg  were  the  sons  of  the  victors  of  Yorktown  and  the  fathers  of  the 
men  who  fought  at  Gettysburg.  It  seems  incredible  that  we  should  have 
failed  when  Washington  was  taken.  The  war  had  then  been  going  on  three 
years  and  yet  we  hadn't  the  good  sense  to  develop  even  a  small  regular  army 
at  that  time.  Now  the  lessons  to  be  learned  from  our  failures  are  clear.  The 
prime  lesson  to  be  learned  from  the  war  of  1812  is  that  it  is  too  late  to  prepare 
for  war  when  war  has  begun.  The  next  lesson  to  be  learned — and  it  is  a  very, 
very  old  lesson — is  that  all  talk  of  a  merely  defensive  war  means  simply  to 
invite  disaster.  There  is  only  one  effective  defense,  and  that  is  the  offensive. 
There  is  only  one  way  to  win  a  fight  and  that  is  by  hitting  and  not  by  parrying. 
We  had  proceeded  for  years  before  1812  on  the  theory  that,  as  has  been  said 
by  one  of  our  presidents,  peace  was  our  passion — and  we  showed  it.  It  was  a 
passion  that  wasn't  shared  by  other  people,  and  we  paid  the  penalty  for  having 
it  our  passion  when  it  wasn't  shared  by  other  people.  There  had  been  a  little 
navy  and  we  laid  it  up;  we  didn't  have  any  regular  army  at  all.  We  started 
to  begin  with  "the  nation  in  arms" — that  was  an  equivalent  expression  at 
the  time  to  "our  gallant  volunteers."  We  got  4,000  men  of  my  own  state  at 
Queenstown  at  the  beginning  of  the  war;  there  was  a  force  of  a  thousand  mixed 
troops  on  the  other  side,  under  a  very  competent  general  named  Brock.  Our 
4,000  militia  got  together;  1,000  were  ferried  across  and  were  attacked.  As 
soon  as  the  noise  of  the  fight  came  across  the  river  the  remaining  3,000  men 
took  refuge  in  a  plea  that  the  Constitution  was  being  violated;  they  appealed 


to  the  Constitution  in  the  true  spirit  of  those  who  appeal  to  it  for  the  purpose 
of  shielding  their  own  inefficiency.  They  had  a  mass  meeting  on  the  field 
and  decided  that  there  was  no  constitutional  authority  to  take  them  outside 
of  the  borders  of  the  United  States,  and  with  that  belated  reverence  for  the 
Constitution  working  in  them  they  declined  to  go  across  to  the  assistance  of  the 
thousand  men  who  were  on  the  other  side  of  the  Niagara,  all  of  whom  were 
either  killed  or  captured.  A  similar  or  rather  worse  incident  occurred — well, 
not  worse,  because  there  is  no  comparative  to  a  superlative — but  as  bad  an 
incident  occurred  in  the  surrender  of  Detroit,  and  the  Bladensburg  business 
was  not  much  better. 

The  little  handful  of  frigates  and  sloops  which  had  been  built  some  fourteen 
years  before  did  admirably.  If  we  had  had  fifteen  ships  of  the  line  as  efficient, 
not  only  individually  but  as  a  fleet,  as  the  Constitution  and  Constellation,  as  the 
Hornet  and  the  Wasp,  there  would  have  been  no  war  and  we  would  have  been 
treated  with  profound  politeness  by  both  England  and  France.  Our  people — 
and  I  don't  think  you  can  blame  the  people,  because  you  couldn't  expect  them 
to  realize  how  things  were — but  our  people  believed  that  instead  of  battleships, 
instead  of  an  army,  you  could  rely  upon  an  attachment  to  peace  and  such 
measures  as  an  embargo,  a  "peaceful  war,"  as  it  was  called;  and  in  conse 
quence  we  had  to  pay  in  life  and  in  treasure  immensely  during  nearly  three 
years  of  warfare,  and  we  had  to  come  within  a  measurable  distance  of  a  great 
disaster  to  the  union,  and  all  because  we  didn't  prepare  in  advance  and  because 
as  a  nation  we  believed  that  our  being  peaceful  in  a  world  that  was  not  peaceful 
would  save  us  from  war  instead  of  provoking  war. 

Now,  gentlemen,  I  believe  most  emphatically  that  we  ought  to  have  a  proper 
history  of  the  United  States  Army,  a  proper  military  history  of  the  United 
States.  I  believe  it  must  be  part  of  the  general  history  of  the  United  States, 
so  far  as  that  general  history  is  concerned  with  the  attitude  of  the  nation 
towards  things  military.  I  believe  it  should  be  written  by  the  general  staff, 
but  that  it  should  be  written  in  collaboration  with  civilians  who  can  write 
with  knowledge  and  frankness  of  those  matters  which  it  is  impossible  to  expect 
even  a  good  military  man  who  is  a  historian  to  write  of  with  knowledge  and 
frankness.  And  I  believe  that  it  will  be  worse  than  useless  if  it  doesn't  tell 
the  exact  truth,  if  it  doesn't  tell  our  disasters  and  shortcomings  just  as  well 
as  our  triumphs,  because  we  shall  have  to  learn  from  those  disasters  just  as 
much  as  from  our  triumphs. 

Gentlemen,  I  thank  you. 

The  following  resolutions  were  adopted  by  the  conference: 

That  in  the  opinion  of  this  conference  military  history  should  be  pursued 
in  a  more  systematic  way;  that  a  committee  of  five  be  appointed  by  the  chair 
to  consider  the  best  method  of  furthering  the  study  and  presentation  of  mili 
tary  history  and  of  bringing  into  common  action  professional  and  civilian 
students. 

That  this  committee  have  authority  to  call  a  further  conference  at  such  time 
and  place  as  they  may  think  suitable,  and  report  their  conclusions  to  that 
conference;  that  the  American  Historical  Association  be  asked  to  appoint  a 
special  committee  to  cooperate  with  the  committee  above  constituted. 

Professor  Dunning  announced  the  following  committee  in  accordance  with 
the  resolution  adopted:  Professor  R.  M.  Johnston,  Chairman;  Professor 
Fred  M.  Fling,  Colonel  T.  L.  Livermore,  Major  J.  W.  McAndrew,  and  Major 
George  H.  Shelton. 

The  conference  then  adjourned. 


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